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HOW HIGH ARE THE GIANTS' SHOULDERS:AN  EMPIRICAL  ASSESSMENT OF 
KNOWLEDGE  SPILLOVERS  AND CREATIVE  DESTRUCTION  IN A MODEL OF 
ECONOMIC  GROWFH 
ABSTRACT 
The pace of industrial  innovation  and growth  is shaped by many forces that interact in complicated 
ways. Profit-maximizing  firms pursue new ideas to obtain market  power, but  the pursuit of the same goal 
by other means that even successful  inventions  art eventually  superseded  by others; this known as creative 
destruction.  New ideas not only yield new goods but also enrich the stock of  knowledge of society  and 
its potential  to produce  new ideas.  To a great extent this knowledge  is non-excludable,  making research 
and inventions the source of  powerful spillovers. The extent of  spillovers depends on the rate at which 
new ideas outdate old ones, that is on the endogenous  technological  obsolescence  of  ideas, and on the rate 
at which knowledge difJises among inventors. 
In this paper we build a simple model that allows us to organize our search for the  empirical 
strength of  the concepts  emphasized  above. We then  use data on patents and patent citations as empirical 
counterparts  of new ideas and knowledge  spillovers, respectively,  to estimate  the model parameters. We 
find  estimates of  the annual rate of  creative destruction in the range of  2 to 7 percent for  the decade of 
the  1970s, which rates  for individual sectors as high as  25 percent. For technological  obsolescence,  we 
find an increase over the century from about 3 percent  per year to about 12 percent per year in 1990, with 
a noticeable plateau in the  l970s.  We find the rate of  diffusion of  knowledge  to be quite rapid, with the 
mean lag  between I and 2 years.  Lastly, we find that the potency of spillovers  from old ideas to new 
knowledge generation (as evidenced by patent citation rate) has been declining over the century: the 
resulting  decline in the effective public stock of knowledge available  to new inventors is quite consistent 
with the observed decline in the  average private productivity  of  research inputs. 
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Room E52-25lB  79 JFK Street 
Cambridge,  MA  02139 and NBER  Cambridge, MA  02138 and NBER 1  INTRODUCTION AND  SUMMARY 
There has been a rapid growth in recent years in the theoretical literature  on industrial 
research as an engine of economic growth.2  At a gross level,  two key concepts are at the 
heart of the growth process in this literature.  First, profit-seeking firms try to  achieve 
market power by producing a better good than their competitors.  Over time, new goods 
displace old ones, earn profits for some period of time, and are then displaced in turn.  This 
process of "creative destruction" generates the incentive for and limits the private value of 
industrial innovation: 
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in mo- 
tion comes from the new  consumers' goods,  the new methods  of production 
or transportation,  the new  markets, the ncw forms of industrial organization 
that capitalist enterprises creates....  [examples]...  [these examples]  illustrate  the 
same process of  industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes  the economic 
structure  from ssithiss, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a 
new  one,  This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capi- 
talism..."  [Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism  and Democracy  (1942)]. 
Thus Schumpeter recognized that innovation  was the engine of  growth, and that innova- 
tion is endogenously generated by competing profit-seeking  firms.  The second key feature 
of models of this process is that public-good  aspects of knowledge  create economy- wide 
increasing returns.  In the process of creating new goods, inventors rely  and build on the 
insights embodied in previous ideas; they achieve their success at least partly by "standing 
upon the shoulders of giants."3 The public stock of knowledge  that accumulates from the 
spillovers  of previous inventions is thus a fundamental input in the technology to generate 
new ideas. This is clearly reflected in Schmookler's  description of the inventor's problem: 
2See Grossman  and llelpman (1991a) and the  references titerein.  In particular, Romer (1990),  Grossmas 
and llelpman  (1991b), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Segerstrom (1991). 
"If I have sees further (than you and Descartes) it is by standing upon the shoulders of Giants." Sir Isaac 
Newton, letter to Robert Hook, February  5, 1675. Nea'ton's  aphorism  was popsiarised  by Robert K. Merton, 
On Ike Shualders  sf Giants,  New York (1965) 
3 The joint determinants of inventions are (a) the wants which inventions sat- 
isfy, and (h) the intellectual ingredients of which they are made. The inventor's 
problem arises in a world of work and play, rest and action, frustration and sat- 
isfaction, health and sickness, and so on....  [I]n order to analyze the problem, to 
imagine possible solutions to it, to estimate their relative cost and difficulty, and 
to reduce one or more to practice, the inventor must use the science and tech- 
nology bequeathed by the past..."  [Jacob  Schmookler,  Invention and Economic 
Growth (1966)]. 
The rich theoretical development of the growth literature  can thus be seen as combining 
the insights of Schumpeter and Schmookler  and embedding them in a general  equilibrium 
framework.  This modelling advance has not,  however,  been accompanied by the develop- 
ment of a parallel empirical literature.4 While there has been significant empirical work on 
different aspects of the microeconomics  of technological change, there has been relatively 
little attempt to integrate individual micro empirical results into an overall framework for 
understanding growth.  Our aim in this paper is to create a framework for incorporating 
the microetonomics of  creative destruction and knowledge  spillovers  into a model of growth, 
and to do so in such a way that we can begin to measure them and untangle the forces that 
determine their intensity and impact on growth. 
We develop a model in the spirit of Grossman and Helpman (1991)  and Aghion and 
Howitt (1992) that gives a simple relationship for the effect of  new products on the value  of 
existing ones.  At any given time, the economy  consists of a continuum of  monopolistically 
competitive goods indexed by their quality, q E (—cc, Ni].  The newest goods are always the 
best, i.e., the process of  research advances  the frontier by increasing N. Due to the quality 
ranking implicit in this process, constant marginal cost producers see their profits — relative 
to those of the (new) leader — decline over time. The rate of decline depends (positively) 
on  the degree  of substitutability  between new  and old goods and  on  the pace at which 
4A notable exception is  Kortunt  (1993) 
4 new goods  are introduced.  This captures the endogenous process of creative destruction 
described above  and, after a few algebraic steps, yields intuitive equations relating the rate 
of growth in a firm's value relative to that of the industry  to the firm's number of new 
ideas relative to the industry average.  By relating the concept of new ideas to that of new 
patents, it is possible to use these equations to gauge the empirical magnitude of creative 
destruction. 
In order to estimate these equations, we use market value and patents data on 567 large 
U.S.  firms.  The data are annual for the period 1965-81,  and the firms are assigned to 21 
technological sectors.  We estimate 21 sectoral  panels and find that, on average (over time 
and sectors), creative destruction is about 4 percent per year. That is, in an average sector 
at an average year a firm that does not invent  sees its value relative to that of the industry 
erode by about 4 percent. This number varies  widely  across  sectors; Drugs has the largest 
average creative destruction, with about 25 percent per year.5  Due to both, the endogenous 
variation in creative destruction and changes in estimated parameters, we also find a sharp 
decline in nverage (across sectors) creative destruction over our sample period, from a high 
of 7 percent per year in the mid 60's to a low of 2 percent in the late 70's. 
Turning from Schumpeter to Schmookler,  we focus on the technology by which new ideas 
are produced, using as inputs private research effort and the public stock of existing ideas. 
We focus particularly on this ideas-stock, the process by which it accumulates, and the way 
in which it conditions the production of  new ideas. 
It is well known that the standard form of the kind of "quality ladder" model that we are 
using embodies a strong form of research spillovers,  because the same amount of resources 
are consumed producing the blueprint for product  q =  N1  at time t as were consumed 
producing the blueprint for product  q = Ni_di at time t — dt, even  though  the former is 
strictly superior to the latter. To pursue Newton's metaphor, today's  inventors stand on the 
5We srgue that, at least in  part, this dispersion  is due the  difficulties in  measuring  dens, since  patents 
play  different  roles  in protecting  innovation  in different  sectors.  In other industries  other  mechanisms  of 
appropiations,  such as secrecy, learning curve advantages and marketing  and product support efforts are more 
important than patents as means of securing rents (Levin et al 1987). 
5 shoulders of giants that keep  getting taller and never get old and weak.  In order to move 
to a spillover  formulation that can be implemented empirically, we specify how the height 
of the shoulders is endogenously determined by the path of  previous invention. 
We postulate  a simple linear technology at the firm level, mapping research-inputs into 
new ideas. This mapping changes over time as a function of the stock of public knowledge. 
That  is, the productivity of private inputs in research varies as  a function  of aggregate 
knowledge,  which is outside the control of  any individual firm. We proceed to specify in some 
detail the process by which previous knowledge  accumulates and feeds into the generation 
of  new ideas. We postulate  that it takes time for additional knowledge  to diffuse sufficiently 
to be of use to other  inventors; this tends to limit the usefulness  of  very recent knowledge in 
generating new knowledge. On the other hand, old knowledge  eventually is made obsolete 
by the emergence of newer, superior knowledge.  We call this phenomenon "knowledge"  or 
"technological"  obsolescence, and distinguish it from the obsolescence in value represented 
by creative destruction. That is, new ideas have two distinct effects on the current stock of 
ideas. They make the products represented by those ideas less valuable (creative destruction 
or value obsolescence)  and they make the knowledge  represented by those ideas less relevant 
in the production of new knowledge  (knowledge or teclmological  obsolescence). The strength 
of  knowledge  spillovers, and  hence the growth of the  economy,  will depend on the parameters 
of the processes of  knowledge diffusion and knowledge  obsolescence. 
At any point in time, we define  the stock of knowledge  available to the production of 
new ideas as the sum of the contribution of all previous ideas. These contributions are the 
product of the number of  ideas in each cohort and the usefulness of the average idea in that 
cohort to current inventions. We describe the usefulness of an idea generated at time s for 
the production of new knowledge  at time t (i ￿  s) in terms of a citation function. In order 
to capture  knowledge  obsolescence,  this function declines with the distance between t and s 
in ideas-space — that is, with  the number of  inventions that occur between the recipient and 
source cohorts. In order to capture gradual knowledge  diffusion,  the usefulness of  old ideas 
increases with the calendar time between these two cohorts.  We also allow for a source- 
6 cohort specific multiplicative constant that indexes the potency of the spillovers  emanating 
from the average idea in the given cohort. 
In order to estimate the citation function we use a 1 in 100 random  sample of all patents 
granted in the U.S. from 1975  to  1992,  and track all their citations to previous patents 
hack  to  1900.  We assume that patents are proportional  to  ideas  and that citations are 
proportional to ideas  used, and we estimate time-varying proportionality factors for each 
along with the model parameters.  Our sample contains  12,592 patents and over  80,000 
citations. 
Several interesting findings emerge from estimating the citation function and from con- 
structing the stock of  public knowledge  implied by this function. First, we find that ideas 
diffuse quite rapidly, with a mean lag between one and two years, which is consistent with 
previous estimates by Mansfield (1985) derived from survey results. Second,  as postulated, 
knowledge  obsolescence  is clearly an endogenous function of the number of  new ideas, rather 
an  exogenous function of  time. The sum of squared residuals falls by about  30 percent when 
straight time depreciation is replaced by endogenous obsolescence  linked to the number of 
new ideas. Third, the average  annual rate of knowledge  or technological obsolescence  over 
the century is about 7 percent, but both its  secular and high frequency (endogenous) changes 
are quite large.  It rises from about 3 percent at the beginning of the century to about 10 
to 12 percent in 1990, with a noticeable plateau during the 70's.  Fourth, the average size of 
patents (measured in terms of the average number of new ideas embodied in each of these) 
increased over the century until the 60s or 70s and has declined since then.  A patent in 1990 
seems to contain about three times more ideas than a patent in 1900, but about 10 percent 
less than a patent in 1970. Fifth, the potency of the spillovers  emanating from each cohort 
seems  to have declined dramatically over the century:  controlling  for obsolescence, we es- 
timate that the average idea at the beginning of the century generated about 5 times the 
level of spillovers  as the average recent idea. Finally, as a result of this decline in spillover 
potency, we esthnate that the effective  (or marginal) public knowledge  stock declined by 
about  30 percent from 1960 to 1990,  suggesting that private research productivity should 
7 have fallen by that amount. 
This last result is subject to a number of caveats relating to assumptions about the exact 
nature of the relationship between spillovers  and citations.  Its implications are, however, 
remarkably consonant with the data on the observed productivity of inputs in research. The 
observed decline in the productivity of private research, as  measured by patent production, 
has been a subject of much research.6  The ratio of patents to research inputs has declined 
steadily since the 50's, almost regardless of the way research-input is measured (e.g.  R&D 
expenditures, number of scientists and engineers engaged in research).7  It is certainly in- 
teresting, if not surprising, that our independent measure of  research productivity, which is 
based on knowledge  flows as measured by citations, has about the same trend as directly 
measured productivity. Put differently,  the fit of the aggregate innovation function — that 
is, the function that relates aggregate (private) research inputs to total innovations — im- 
proves markedly once we include our measure of the public stock of  knowledge  ore the right 
hand side. 
In the last step of the empirical section  we relate aggregate consumption growth to the 
rate of new idea creation.  In effect,  this amounts to finding the normalization constant 
that allows  us to estimate the overall  average  size of a patent — a parameter that is not 
identified from the citation estimation alone. With this, we have empirical estimates of all 
of the important model parameters.  Combining these estimates with a free entry condition 
in the research sector and a labor market equilibrium condition, we close the model and 
calibrate it to fit the average  rate of  growth of the U.S. during  the postwar period. The  model 
can then be used to perform several positive and normative experiments. Though  we are 
uncomfortable making too much of results that depend on a long  sequence  of assumptions 
and approximations, we note  that  the model's behavior: (1) is quite consistent with the 
aggregate productivity  slowdown  in the 1970s; (2) is also consistent with the stock market 
6See Gritiches (1989 and 1990); Kortum (1993); and Evesson  (1991)  7See  Kortom (1993).  Schroookler  (1966)  suggests  that patents per research  effort has been  declining 
throoghoot the century. 
S boom of the l9SOs (because the estimated decline in the productivity of research implies an 
increase in the value  of existing ideas); and (3) suggests that the optimal subsidy to private 
R&D  expenditures  is around 30 percent. 
We dp not view these specific results (which are perhaps better categorized as  provocative 
conjectures) as the main contribution of the paper. Rather, we have shown that it is possible 
to construct an  overall modelling framework  into which the key microeconomic  pieces of the 
processes of industrial innovation and growth can be  fit, and empirical estimates  of the 
model parameters do allow the model to mimic the economy's gross growth behavior. 
The next pages describe the details behind this summary. We begin in Section 2 with 
the complete presentation of the model itself.  Section 3 presents the empirical methodology 
and results; for reasons explained therein it is  organized in a different order than this 
summary and the model presentation, beginning with the citation function and ending with 
the creative destruction equation.  Section 4 calibrates the model, and studies the impact 
of different  policy and structural  changes  on growth and research incentives.  Section 5 
concludes  the paper  with  a discussion  of the overall significance of  the results and suggestions 
for future work. 
2  THE MODEL 
2.1  Goods markets 
There is a representative agent endowed with a stock of ideas, .t units of  labor, which have 
no direct utility value, an instantaneous utility function that is logarithmic in an aggregate 
consumption index, C, and a discount factor, p.  Using aggregate consumption as numeraire 
and  letting r  represent the real interest rate, we obtain the standard  condition on the growth 
rate of consumption, C: 
C=r—p.  (1) 
At any point in time, the aggregate consumption index is  a composite of the quality 
9 weighted output of a continuum of  monopolistic competitors, which produce goods indexed 
by their quality:  x2(q) for q E  (—co  P12].  Quality rises monotonically over time, so newer 
goods are better:8 
N, 
C2  f  {xj(q)ee)adq  0 ￿  ￿  1.  (2) 
Given aggregate consumption and the  prices  of each of the components of it, pt(q). 
consumers choose  x2(q) so as to minimize  the cost of that level of aggregate consumption: 
p2(q  t(q) dq. 
The  first order condition for this problem yields the system of  demands for goods of  different 
qualities: 
x2(q) = p2(q)iterP5Ct.  (3) 
At each  point in time, producers take these demand functions, as well as factor (labor) 
prices, ni1, as given.  For simplicity, let the production technology  be  linear and assume that 
process innovations have no distributive impact:9 
x2(q) = qjL]'(q),  (4) 
where L'(q) is  labor allocated to production of zt(q) and 'it is labor productivity in the final 
goods sector at time t. More generally, this may be taken as the reduced form of a constant 
returns  to scale technology including other factors of production.  In the latter case  the 
rental price of  other factors would combine to add a multiplicative constant to the reduced 
form production function. 
The linearity of technology, together with the common level of productivity and elas- 
51t is important to realize that the quality ladder aspect is in  sddiUsn to the menopolistically  competitive 
structure of the market. Stokey's  (1992) elegant and general  representation  of preferences includes a discrete 
state space version of ours. 
51.e. these innovations  affect £he technologies of goods  of all qualities  similarly. 
10 ticities of demand faced by the infinitesimal producers of the different qualities, determines 
that at any given point in time all prices are identical and obey a standard markup rule:'° 
1  m1 
pi(q) = 
a 
Replacing  this expression  in (3) and the results of it in  (2),  determines the consumption 
wage:  f1—a\ N 
oJg = aq  e 
Thus the price can also be expressed in terms of labor's productivity in the goods  sector, 
m  and the quality level of the leading  good, N: 
p1(q) =  e". 
Profits accruing to a producer of a good of quality q can now he easily determined from 
the equilibriuns  values of  xi(q), pi(q) and wi:" 
= 
It is interesting to notice that profits do not fall with a for all levels of q.  This is due 
to a  scope effect.  As goods become  more substitutable,  the profits generated by having a 
new —the best — good increase in spite of the reduced markup since the new product  has 
a larger potential  market. The other side of this is that goods  become obsolete much faster 
(for a given rate of entry) since many newer goods can substitute them away:  Simply put, 
a stronger creatjve destruction environment — indexed  by a — is better for those that are 
'5llecause of their lower quality, older goods will have smaller  market shares, but because  of the  assumed 
desire  for variety they never disappear  completely (except  in  the limiting case a = 1). 
iNote that if the number of  varieties  is "small," as is the case in the standard variety  model  without quality 
ranking where q c [O,?i], profits  would be  ir1(g)  = acir1t('/(l 
— e-').  The ranking aspect of 
quality introduces  a "discounting-like"  component  to the aggregators  so we can  work immediately  with  as 
"infinite—variety" model.  This  eliminates  a host of short run dynamics  issues that ace standard io vaciety 
models.  Also see Stokey (1992). 
11 creating and worse for those that have created in the past. 
2.2  Valuation, Innovation and Labor Market 
The fundamental value of a new market created at time I is: 
= f  (N)e L  rs ds dr. 
Dividing both sides by aggregate consumption, letting V a  v1/C, differentiating this ratio 
with respect to time,  and recalling (1),  yields  a differential equation characterizing the 
dynamic behavior of the value of an innovation in terms of units of consumption: 
/  a  •\  ir(N2)  V= 
Replacing the expression for profits in this equation, yields: 
(5) 
which is to be compared with the change in the value (in terms of  units of consumption) of 
the idea that has just been left behind the frontier, V°: 
V7=pV—o.  (6) 
Comparing (5) and (6) shows that the "obsolescence"  rate faced  by owners  of blueprints 
is 1-°N, which we call the rate of creative destruction.  It is proportional to -the rate of 
advancement of the knowledge  frontier. It also depends on consumers' demand for variety; 
as a approaches unity, the market share of the newest product approaches unity, so we truly 
have a "gale"  of creative destruction.  One  focus of our empirical work will be to provide 
estimates of this term for different industries and periods.  We return to this below. 
The other side of the value of an innovation is the cost of  generating it. As is standard  in 
12 the literature, we postulate  a simple linear research technology at the firm level.  A firm that 
invests L, units of effort in the time interval di generates O,L,dt new blueprints.'2  These 
blueprints are worth 8,L,V,C,dt to the inventing firm, thus free entry guarantees that: 
,  ￿  G,V,C,, 
with equality if there is positive innovation. 
Aggregating over all innovators yields  the demand for labor by the research sector:'3 
N,  — 
Similarly,  we can obtain the demand for labor by goods producers, Lç: 
L' =1  f1-1dq =  - 17 
Full employment equilibrium in the labor market is then obtained by letting: 
L+L=L.  (7) 
2.3  Spillovers, Knowledge Diffusion and Knowledge Obsolescence 
The innovation function described in words above corresponds to the demand for labor in 
the research sector, rearranged: 
N,=O,L.  (8) 
129, is  assumed  to be  deterministic  at the  aggregate  (sectoral)  level; we will  model it below as a function 
of past knowledge  accumulation in the sector. We will assume that 9, is independent  of current and previous 
actions  by i, so the value of any pscticular  firm is just the goods market  value of its blueprints. In other words, 
firms do not have private stocks of past  knowledge. We discuss this issue  further in Section 3.2. 
'°Note that 9, may depend on aggregate  quantities,  ,ncluding L, although  in the latter case the  notation 
is less useful. 
13 This equation hides in  O  most of what  is  of  interest to  economists.  It is  the average 
productivity of research in generating new blueprints; it may contain standard aggrcgtUc 
factors  of production  (e.g.  capital and labor)'4 as well as spillovers  from past  knowledge 
production.  We will  focus  on the latter but  discuss briefly  the former in the empirical 
section. 
With few exceptions, the standsrd  endogenous growth model treats 9, as an arbitrary 
given constant. Such a specification  conveys a strong form of  intertemporal spillover, where 
the quality of new goods  builds one for one on the top of the quality of the previous gen- 
eration of goods.  Labor productivity in research — i.e.  8, — is independent of the level or 
pace at which ideas emerge,  and is disconnected from the spillover process itself. 
In this section we explicitly model several aspects of the process of diffusion of  informa- 
tion that should influence  8,.  In  particular, we consider three  types of  factors.  First, there is 
the concept of endogenous  obsolescence. Very old ideas are unlikely to contain much inde- 
pendent information that is useful  for generating new ideas. Unlike  the traditional notion of 
"depreciation," the obsolescence  of  old ideas ought to be connected to the distance between 
ideas in the state rather than the time dimension.  That  is, it  is  not the passage of time 
that makes old ideas less useful, it is the accumulation of  new ideas. Second,  inventors take 
time in seeing others' inventions, which suggests that there are diffusion lags.  Unlike obso- 
lescence,  we treat the diffusion of  knowledge as a function of time rather than accumulated 
inventions."  Third, the spillover intensity between cohorts  of  ideas may vary independent 
of the effect of obsolescence of  old ideas. 
We capture these factors of the transmission mechanism  by means of a "citations" func- 
tion, a(t, s) for it  s.  We assume  that this function depends on the probability of seeing 
or knowing about an idea (it — 
.s)  years old, and the usefulness  of old ideas in generating 
new ones.  We take the probability of seeing an idea (1 
— s) years  old to be  (1 
— e''1). 
t4With either positive or negative  coefficients; thus with incressing  or  decressiog aggregate  returns to scale 
in the research  technology. 
"Some state dependency  of knowledge  diffusion is likely, but it seems plausible  that time would  he  the 
primary factor. 
14 As '  —* m, diffusion becomes instantaneous;  y = 0 means that all old blueprints are un- 
available, so each inventor starts from scratch. In order to capture the first and last factors 
mentioned above, we assume an  index of  usefulness of the form 86_0(N,  -N4  The  term in the 
exponential reflects  the notion that the usefulness  of old ideas in the generation of new ideas 
depends on how far the technology has moved  since the old idea.  The parameter  8 could 
capture two distinct effects.  it could represent the "potency" of the spillovers emanating 
from each cohort of ideas.  It could also represent an "absorption" parameter, measuring 
the intensity of use of old ideas by  new ideas.  The former  interpretation  implies  that 8 
might  vary  over s; the latter interpretation suggests the possibility of variation over t.  In 
principle, one could imagine interaction effects,  i.e.  variations over (a, t) pairs.  In the em- 
pirical section we focus on variation in 8 over a, that is, variations in the potency of the 
spillovers  emanating from different cohorts of old knowledge.  There are a combination of 
conceptual and practical reasons for this, as will be discussed below.  For now we simply 
treat 8 as a constant, since this simplifies the explanation of the basic elements of the process 
of knowledge accumulation. 
The citations function is the product of the usefulness  of old ideas and the probability 
of having seen them:'6 
a(t, a) = Sc_0(N_Ns) (i 
— e'))  I ￿  a,  (9) 
with  ￿  0, /3 >.0  and 0 ￿  8 ￿  1. 
We let 0, be the sum over all the potentially "citable" cohorts of  ideas:'7 
N, 
a(t, s(q)) dq =  o(t, s)N, da, 
"We have saved on notation by working with a single sector model, but it would be straightforward  (from 
a modelling perspective)  to add multiple  sectors, with differing rates of obsolesceace and diffusion within and 
across sectors.  Empirical  implementation  of the multi-sector  version would not be trivial. We  will comment 
further on this in Section 5 below. 
irIt is  easy  to add othec standard ingredients  to 0,, including,  e.g. decressing  returns to current labor  in 
research  See eg. Kortum (1993), Stokey (1992), Jones  (1992).  We also comment on this possibility in Section 
3.3  below. 
15 which can be written  as: 
=  — 5e('2)  ds+ys(e) q•  (10) 
This specification of the productivity of research effort, 0, has several  interesting features. 
First, as the speed of diffusion goes to infinity,  8 converges  to a constant: 
(11) 
The insensitivity of the research productivity parameter to the rate of invention in this 
limiting case is the result  of  two offsetting factors. The increased obsolescence of the existing 
knowledge  stock that is inhereot in an economy  moving (inventing) at a faster pace is 
exactly offset by the increased rate at which new  knowledge  is added to that stock.  This 
is illustrated  in Figure 2.1.  There, we depict two economies  — A and B — starting with 
the same level of  knowledge (normalized to 0) but in A inventions occur at twice the rate of 
B (for reasons other than parameters of the innovation function). An inventor standing at 
11 in A has a larger number of inventions behind her, but the more rapid rate of invention 
means that a larger fraction of that stock is now obsolete. Equation (11)  says that these 
forces exactly cancel each other when information diffusion is instantaneous, so that the 
marginal productivity of  research in the two economies would be the same.5 Put differently, 
with instantaneous diffusion the right "clock"  for spillovers  is determined by the number of 
inventions: if the pace at which these occor increases, so does the speed of the economic 
clock, bringing about  offsetting obsolescence,  which  leaves the amount of  spillover  unchanged 
at the margin. 
Second, for  given {N},<2, 8 is proportional to 5, which is the fraction of total knowledge 
that is of potential  use for new inventions. Also, if diffusion  is instantaneous, 0 is inversely 
proportional  to the rate  at which new  ideas outdate old ones, /1.  Thus, putting aside 
'5That is, s given amount of research labor would generate  the same  N in the two economies. 
16 diffusion  lags, the strength  of spillovers  depends directly on the exogenous  usefulness  of old 
knowledge,  8, and inversely on the rate at which it is made obsolete, /3. 
The third important feature  of our formulation for 8,  is that lags in the diffusion of 
information — i.e.  7 finite —  change  the relation between the pace of inventions and the 
productivity of labor in research by introducing a form of dynamic decreasing returns. 
Returning to Figure 2.1,  if -y is finite it is no longer true that the marginal productivity 
of labor in research at t1 is the same in economies  A and B.  Because of diffusion lags, an 
increase in the rate of innovation does  not add to the stock of knowledge  fast enough to 
offset the higher rate of  obsolescence. The fraction of the stock of knowledge observed by 
inventors in an economy where the rate of  inventions is relatively high is limited by the fact 
that a large amount of inventions have  occurred only recently, when things are difficult  to 
observe. In other words, in this case there is a second and exogenous  clock that anchors the 
economy.'9  Thus the productivity of  research 8, decreases with the rate of  invention. 
The next step in presenting the model is to descnbe the dynamic equilibrium behavior 
of the model. We postpone this until after estimating the key parameters of the model, for 
then the examples used to characterize equilibrium can be made more meaningful. 
3  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1  Overview 
The previous section presented a general equilibrium model of the processes of knowledge 
accumulation, research, innovation, product market competition, and economic  growth. To 
estimate the parameters of the model, and to test its predictions against economic  experi- 
ence, requires finding measurable empirical constructs  that  correspond to the elements of 
the model. In this section, we plunge  in and make attempts to estimate each of the impor- 
"Although the  model makes a stack distinction  between lags (which occur by the  "time clock") and obso- 
lescence (which occurs by tbe "invention clock"), the effects discussed  here will occur ss long as the speed of 
diffusion is  less responsive to changes in the rate of innovation  than is  technological obsolescence. 
17 tant blocks of the model.  We do not attempt to estimate the overall system of equations 
implied by the model as a whole,  because the theoretical and empirical compromises that 
are necessary to find empirical counterparts to the model constructs cannot really be applied 
consistently across  the different  parts of the model.  For example, the model has a highly 
stylized notion of "firms" who own no assets other than blueprints. The creative destruction 
equation (5) describes the time path of the value of blueprints or ideas.  To estimate this 
equation we will use data on real firms.2°  To do this, we will derive the model's implications 
for the value of a firm, conceived  as a collection  of  blueprints. This will involve assumptions 
that we believe are reasonable, but we do not  go back  and work out the overall implica- 
tions of these assumptions for the model as a whole.  Similarly, confronting the data will 
require us to allow for lags between invention and patent applications, patent applications 
and patent grants, invention and new product introduction, etc.  We try to allow for these 
lags in reasonable ways,  but we do not formally incorporate them into the overall model. 
To say it differently,  we recognize that the loose correspondence  between the model and the 
data prevents us from interpreting the model too literally. 
In the following  subsections we will discuss  measurement issues in some detail. Overall, 
we will use patents as corresponding to ideas, implying the number of patents in a period, 
country, sector, etc.  can be taken as proportional — sometime with lags — to the  corre- 
sponding  We treat firms as  agglomerations of  ideas, represented by their patent  holdings; 
we take their market value as representing the value of their idea portfolio. We use counts 
of Research Scientists and Engineers to represent research labor, though we explore the use 
of R&D expenditures as well.  Finally,  we use consumption expenditure from the National 
Income Accounts to measure total expenditure. 
We present the empirical results  in approximately the reverse order from the model 
25The closest thing to an empirical  analogue nf the value of an ides is the work of Schankerman  and Fakes 
(1986),  Fakes (1986) and Pakes and Simpson  (1989) on the  value of patents.  As  these authors emphasize, 
however, they are estimating the  value of patent protection,  i.e., the dzffereace between  the value of the idea 
if it is patented and its value  if it is not.  Fakes (1985) estimates  the stock market response  to the "news" 
represented  by a new patent.  Thus his estimates of the value  of a patent exclude  the portion that was 
predictable  based on past patents asd R&D. 
'S development.  We begin with the construction of U, the productivity of labor in research. 
To do this, we use a random  sample of  all U.S. patents  granted since 1975, and the complete 
history  of previous patents cited by our sample patents.  We  take a citation  as evidence 
that the earlier knowledge  was used in the later invention, suggesting that the frequency of 
citation can be used to measure e(t, s) in equation (9).  Since we obsen'e many (t, a) pairs, 
we can estimate the parameters S and -y of  equation (9), while at the same time estimating 
a (time-varying) proportionality factor between patents and pAT.  From this estimation, we 
construct an estimate of  U  (up to additive and multiplicative factors). 
Next, we move to the innovation function, equation  (8).  Using  the constructed U, from 
the citation distributions, we estimate the relationship hetween patents and corporate re- 
search at thc aggregate level in the U.S.  We show that by converting patents  to N using the 
parameter csti,nates from the first step, including U,, and normalizing the research measures 
in the way implied by the model, we can improve  the fit between patents  and research, and 
shed light on the puzzle noted by many researchers of the falling patent/R&D  ratio in the 
last several decades (Griliches (1989); Kortum (1993)). In Section 3.4, we look at the aggre- 
gate U.S.  relationship between N and the growth rate of consumption, and compare it to 
the prediction of equation (21).  We find that the low-frequency  movements in consumption 
follow a pattern very similar to those in N, though displaced in time by a few years.  We 
conjecture that this is consistent with the model if there is  a lag (not in the model) be- 
tween the act of invention and the product  market introduction of new  goods.  Finally, we 
return to the value side of the model.  We estimate a version of equation (5), the "creative 
destructinn" equation, using data on firms assigned to technological sectors. We construct 
estimates of the rates of endogenous obsolescence  or creative destruction for these sectors 
during the decade of the 1970s. 
19 3.2  Knowledge diffusion, technological obsolescence and patent 
citations 
As discussed in Section 2.3, the limiting form of the model has a strong form of spillovers 
in which the incremental innovation always  comes at the same cost, regardless of how far 
knowledge has advanced.  More realistically, inventors can build on the existing stock of 
knowledge, but there are limits on its usefulness in creating the next idea.  Equation (10) 
captures the more general case in which the research productivity parameter  8 depends on 
the stock of existing ideas, with each existing idea weighted by the probability that it is 
useful in generating new knowledge at time it.  These probabilities are, in turn, dependent 
on the likelihood that the previous idea is known to a current inventor, and the likelihood 
that it is useful. 
To implement this approach, we use patents  as an  indicator of the  creation of new ideas, 
and the "citations"  (also called references) that patents  make  to previous patents as  an 
indicator of "existing ideas used in the creation of new ideas.".  There is a vast literature 
on the virtues and vices of patent data, which addresses such issues  as the large number 
of inventions that are never patented; variations in the "propensity to patent" of different 
institutions,  diffçrent  industries and over time;  and the large variability in the  "size"  or 
importance of individual patents.21  For our purposes, we will simply assume that N,  is 
proportional to the rate of patenting at time it, with the proportionality factor treated as a 
(time-varying) parameter  to be estimated. 
When a patent  is granted, the patent  document identifies a list of  references  or citations, 
which are previous patents upon which the current patent  builds.22  The citations serve the 
legal function of identifying previous patents that delimit the property right  conveyed  by 
the patent. Since citations indicate that a current invention builds on an older one, we will 
use the total number of  citations from patents issued in year it  to patents issued in year s as 
21 For a recent survey, see Geiliches (1990). 
22References are  also made to non-pstent materials such  as scientific  articles:  we are  not using  this infor- 
mation. For an application  that does, see 'ttajtenberg, Hendeeaon and Jaffe (1992). 
20 an indicator  of the use of  knowledge of  vintage s in the production of  new ideas at time t. 
Of course, not all citations represent spillovers; it is possible, for example, that the inventor 
was  not  even  aware  of the earlier work  at the time the invention was made.23  As  with 
variations in the number of new ideas represented by the average patent, we will deal with 
variations in the relationship between citations and spillovers  by allowing a (time- varying) 
proportionality factor between "ideas used" and citations, and estimating this factor as a 
parameter.  Not surprisingly, the need  to allow for this "slippage" between citations and 
spillovers  will limit to some extent the conclusions  that we can draw; we return to this issue 
below. 
Thus the empirical strategy of this subsection is to collect citation frequencies between 
patent cohorts, and use these to estimate o(t,  s) for many I and s.  We then estimate econo- 
metrically a version of Equation (9), obtaining estimates of the parameters  S and ,  the 
"potency" of old ideas and the diffusion rate of knowledge,  as well as the proportionality 
factors that map patents into ideas and citations into "ideas used." Producing these esti- 
mates  allows  us to do  two things.  First, we can use our estimates of the proportionality 
factor between patents and ideas to construct a time series for N from the patent series. 
Second,  we use  the estimates of the parameters from the citation function, combined with 
the N2 series, to construct &, the predicted contribution of  old knowledge to the production 
25The final dscisioa as to what citations must appesr belongs  with the  pstent examiner, but it is ths result 
of sn interactive process involving  the inventor,  the  inventor's  attorneys, and the examiner. All of these 
parties can identify  potential citations  by searching the relevant  "prior  art." Until  the late 1970s this was 
done  by hand,  using as a guide  the  Patent Office classification of the patent.  Today,  all parties have access 
to on-line text-search  capabilities.  The incentives faced by each of these parties are  complicated.  First, the 
applicant bears a legal obligation  to disclose any prior art of which she has knowledge; the primary sanction 
for non-performance  appears to be the danger of losing the  good will of the examiner  (who also  makes the 
decisions  as to whether  the  patent  will  issue, what claims  will be  permitted, and so forth).  Second,  the 
applicant would,  in a sense, prefer  fewer citations,  since citations may limit  the scope of the  property right. 
On  the other hand, omission of important references can be  grounds  for invalidation  of the patent, giving 
the applicant an incentive  to make sure that citations appear.  For the exanuner,  identifying  citations not 
provided  by the applicant is  time-consuming.  It appears that it is just as  common for applicants and their 
attorneys to press  for the inclusion of additional references as it is for them to resist inclusion  of references 
(personal communication,  Ms. Jane Myers, U.S. Patent Office). For more discussion on the interpretation of 
citations  as evidence of knowledge flows, see Trajtenbsrg, Henderson and laffe  (1992) sod Jaffc, Trajtenberg 
and Henderson  (1993). 
21 of new ideas. 
Our data consist of a 1 in 100 random  sample of  all patents  in the U.S. granted between 
the beginning of 1975 and the fall of 1992.  Simple statistics on these data are shown in 
Table 3.1.  They consist of 12,592  patents containing 81,777 citations.  The sample varies 
(due to variations in the overall grant rate) from a low of 443 patents in 1979 to a high of 
935 in 1991.  We have valid citations going as far back as 1871.25 Thus we have observations 
over  'f' from 1975 to 1992 and "s" from 1871 to 1992.  As can be seen from the Table, the 
distributions over (t 
— s) have extremely long tails. The  mean lag in years is about 16 years; 
the median is about 10 and the mode is about 3. 
We want to use these citation frequencies  to estimate o(t, 3).  Let Ce,, be the observed 
citations in the sample from patents in year 2 to patents in year ,26 Let S2 be the number 




Thus, a(t,  s) is  an estimate  of the probability that a patent in year  2  cites a patent 
in year s.  Panel (a) in Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of o(t,s) over s from 1900 for 
each 2.  We restrict  ourselves  to the distributions since  1900;  before that date the citation 
24lnventors from every  country in  the world  take out patents in the  U.S. Of  course,  othsr countries  also 
grant patents. We will use the phrase "patents  in the U.S." to refer to patents issued by the U.S. patent office, 
regardless of the nationality  of the iaventor or other considerations.  In this subsection,  we utilize  a sample  of 
all such patents. In the next subsection,  we will use the phrase  "U.S. patents" to mean patents (in the U.S.) 
that derive from research in the U.S. 
25The citations are identified  by patent number in a commercial database produced  by Micropatest. Inc. 
Patent numbers can be used to assign grant years for the patents, because numbers  are used sequentially;  the 
patent number of the first patent issued each year  back to 1836 is published  in the Hislerical  Slotistics of tile 
U.S. The Micropatent  data contain  a small but  significant  number  (about  .3%) of 5-digit cited patents, which 
if correct would be  patents issued before 1871. On inspection of the  actual patent documents,  we determined 
that maay  of these are,  in fact,  not patent numbers at all but  "reissue"  numbers.  Thus, without manual 
inspection  there is  no way to know if any of these 5-digit citations are actually valid early patents. 'l'hus  we 
have simply dropped them from the datsset summarized  in Table 3.1. Citations with 6-digit or greater patent 
numbers appear to all be  valid.  Since patent number  100,000 was issued in 1870, we treat all citations 1871 
or later as valid. 
26Pateots are  dated here by the time of grant. We will discuss timing issues further below. 
22 frequencies are often zero or one, and hence are very noisy estimates of the true frequency.2T 
Panel (b) shows the function o(t,  s) for an arbitrary year (19S5).  The distributions shown 
in the Figure have the expected "double exponential" shape. Moreover, the increasing part 
is quite short, suggesting that speed of diffusion is fast. We return to this below. 
To go from o(t,  s) to o(t, s)  we must be explicit about the relationships between (i) 
citations and "used ideas" and (ii) patents and N.  We assume that citations are proportional 
to "used ideas" with a proportionality factor 73t.  That is, the patent  office and its examiners 
have a set of rules  and practices that determine what patents actually get cited.  These do 
nut affect the actual use of old knowledge  in the generation of new, but  they do affect the 
number of citations.  Further,  these practices can change  over time.  We also assume  that 
/3N  is  proportional to patents, with proportionality factor  528  We can think of  7//3 as 
the "average size" of a patent.29  Many interpretations can be given to this  "size"  and its 
variation over  time.  One can think of each patent as encompassing a set of distinct ideas. 
Alternatively, since not all ideas are patented, one can think of s/i/fl as the reciprocal of the 
probability that'any given idea is patented.  Since we care about  s/i  only  to the extent it 
lets us use patents for N, we will consider these different interpretations  only to the extent 
that they  help us think about the plausibility of the estimates.  Using C,,3/s/1 for "ideas 
used"  and (s/'//3)P for N, we can write an expression for o(t, s) in terms of observablea  and 
parameters: 
l.s  2  —I  —i  —  9  o(t a) =  = (/3 /&)s/'  bb  o (t s).  (L) 
(1/fl2)/1514,p 
Since  is purely a measurement parameter, we will  absorb 1/732  into it and  simply 
write  from now on. This gets us almost to the point of being able to rewrite equation (9), 
2TWe  could, of coarse,  estimate  the variaace  of a(t, a) sad weight accordingly, hat thcsc cstioiations  take 
very bag to raa as is. We decided that say additional  information  present  ia the noisy early years was aot 
worth the increase in computational  time necessary to include  them. 
28We  choose this parameterization  to emphasize that  the parameter  is not idcatifled by the patent eqaation. 
We will identify it using the growth equation  below. 
29The inverse of the  "propensity  to patent" (Griliches (1990)). 
23 (the expression for the probability than an idea will be used as a function of elapsed time 
and elapsed N) in terms of observables.  The only additional step is to note that (N1 
— N,) 
— the number  of ideas between s and t — is, under our assumptions, just the number of 
patents granted between s and t, weighted  by the appropriate b,/fl. Equation (9) can be 
rewritten: 
o(t,s) =  1,5,erp (—fl 9)  (i 
— e')),  t ￿  s.  (13) 
Equation (13) is the key empirical construct of the paper.  Because of the multiplicity 
of parameters  and unfamiliarity of this sort of data,  it requires several  comments before 
we proceed to the results. First, because of the need to estimate the proportionality factor 
between patents  and N, we cannot estimate  from the citation data.  That is,  we can 
use Equation  (13) to recover from the citation data the relative size of patents in different 
cohorts in terms of ideas, but we cannot estimate the overall average size without bringing 
in additional information.35 (We will use the relationship between N and growth for this 
purpose.) Second,  because we have multiple observations over both s and t, the parameters 
in this equation are all identified in principle, up to a normalization that sets one 5,31 
Third,  though the parameters 4 and 5,  appear symmetrically in Equation  (13), we 
interpret  them very differently.  We treat  —  the proportionality factor between "ideas 
used"  and citations  —  as a pure nuisance parameter,  because the citations process holds 
nu  interest for us other than as a window  on the spillover process.  We need to allow 
to vary over  t because citations per patent have  been  rising  rapidly, and there are good 
reasons to believe that institutional changes are the reason.  On the other band, 5,  is  a 
key model parameter; its variation over time captures changes in the potency of knowledge 
spillovers.  As already mentioned, we find a significant  fall in this potency over the century, 
and associate this fall with the observed reduced productivity of private research. 
30Equivalently, we can estimate  fiN but not N. 
3tTo see this, it is important to understand that  and  b,  ace not different parameters;  for any given year 
we have the same "propensity  to patent" whether  we  are looking at that  year as a citing or cited  year. 
24 It is, of course, crucial  for identification that we do not have parameters  S and ,  or 
8st and  That is, we  do not allow the potency of spillovers  to depend on the receiving 
cohort, and we do not allow the proportionality factor between citations and "ideas used" 
to vary with the cited or "used" cohort, and we do not allow  "interaction terms" in either. 
Each of these restrictions requires comment.  By not allowing S  to  vary  over t or st we 
are saying that  new-invention cohorts do not vary  in their ability to use the  knowledge 
of the past, and that the potency of a given histori: cohort in generating spillovers  is a 
once-and-for-all attribute that  does not vary  over the  succeeding  cohorts.  In other words, 
today's inventors may have  available to them more or less knowledge  than was available to 
yesterday's inventors, but  there is nothing intrinsic about the nature of today's inventions 
or inventive process that makes previous knowledge  more or less useful to today's inventors 
than  yesterday's knowledge  was to yesterday's inventors.  Further,  (holding obsolescence 
constant) the potency of, e.g., 1920 inventions  for facilitating new inventions was the same 
in 1960 as it is thday.  In our model, in which quality is a unidimensional attribute so that 
the "nature"  of inventions never really changes,  these seem like natural restrictions.  In a 
richer model, in which there were multiple quality dimensions,  then one might imagine that 
the focus of invention today might be more or less similar to that of 1920 than the focus  of 
invention was in 1960,  suggesting that potency would  vary with i and/or st. Of course, to 
the extent that variations in citation practices make it necessary to allow for variations in  ,  it is not clear how variations in S across t could be identified. 
The restriction on ,  though not empty, seems more innocuous.  What we are saying is 
that the "propensity to cite" past patents does not vary  over the different  historic cohorts, 
and that patent office practices may change over time  and this may change the number of 
citations (holding spillovers  constant), but  that these changes do not  affect  past  cohorts 
differentially. Both of these propositions seem to be consistent with our impressions of the 
examining process. The biggest changes have been computerization of the patent database, 
allowing on-line text  searches to facilitate identification of citations, changes in the proce- 
dures for bringing citations to the examiners' attention that have made it easier for the 
25 examiners to  include  citations in the patent document, and a perceived increase in the 
enforcement of the legal obligation on inventors to disclose knowledge  of prior art.32 
A fourth observation on Equation (13) relates to the way the parameter  b — number 
of ideas per patent over time — enters  the equation.  Because  the flow of new ideas is not 
observed, any attempt to pin down variations in the propensity to patent requires having a 
second indicator (besides the rate of patenting) of the rate of knowledge  generation.33  In this 
case, our second indicator is the rate of  decline in the citation of  old knowledge. That is, if 
the patents  during some historical period were unusually large, in the sense of incorporating 
many ideas in each patent, then they should have  made previous knowledge  obsolete to 
a greater extent than would  be expected based on the number of patents.  This  will be 
reflected in the data in the form of a reduced number of  citations to these previous periods. 
Of  course, a period with larger than average patents would also receive more citations itself, 
and that is captured by the presence of  fr, in front of the exponential.31  Because of the 
presence of the  and  parameters, however,  this effect probably contributes less to the 
estimation of the 5s than the exponential term.35 
Thus the model has  two distinct parameters  that  relate to the average "importance," 
broadly speaking, of patents of a given eohort.ae  The variation over time in the parameter 
captures any  differences  in the number of new ideas embeded in the average patent. 
The variation over time in the parameter fi captures variations in the potency (in terms of 
spillover generation) of the ideas themselves. 
Finally, we note that  the  diffusion  of knowledge  is assumed to occur at a rate that  is 
measured in time rather than elapsed inventions. This seems natural.  It is less obvious that 
32Personal communication,  Jane Myers, U.S. Patent Office. 
See Pakes and Griliches  (1984). 
°4Similarly, if a period's patents are bigger than average, they will make more citations; this is captured by 
the  presence of 'i  out fcnnt. 
351f  we estimated  the model with a free and  complete set of the parameters  8,, there would be no contribution 
to the estimation  of the time pattern of '  from  its presence out front. Since, however, we constrain  the Ss to 
follow particular functional  forms, this is not the case. 
36Note that the  "size" of ideas themselves, in terms  of the product quality  improvement  they allow, does not 
vary except in the specific way defined by the exponential  form  in which q enters the  aggregate  ronsumption 
good (Equation (2)). 
26 the diffusion parameter  need be constant over time, but we did not explore its variation. 
We estimated variations of equation (13) by non-linear least squares on the set of ob- 
servations consisting of (s, 1) pairs with t varying between 1975  and  1992  and £  varying 
between 1900 and  t.37  Though a model in which all of the Ss and 's are allowed to vary 
over all s and t is identified in principle, we did not  attempt  to estimate it.  Rather, we 
followed a strategy of (1) always  allowing  a full set of multiplicative constants ,, to control 
for changes in citation practices, and (2) using a combination of dummies over longer time 
periods and polynomial functions of time to capture variations in both S and b over time. 
The results are presented in Table 3.2.  The first column shows the simplest model one 
could imagine estimating, in which we ignore the  "two clocks"  and estimate both diffusion 
arid depreciation off of the lag in years between s ancP t. Not surprisingly (having seen Figure 
3.1)  this model fits the data reasonably well.  We get an estimate for  of about  .8, and an 
estimatc for the "obsolescence"  rate of about .075 per year. As would be expected from the 
rising average citations made per patent shown  in Table 3.1, the estimates of th  rise from 
1975 to 1992.  This is a result that  is  apparent in  all specifications.  Next, we substitute 
elapsed patents for time in the depreciation term,  while  still maintaining constancy over 
time in  S. and  5,.  To facilitate interpretation  of the results, we use for the terms in the 
summation in Equation (13)  the number of patents in  each  year divided by  the sverage 
(over the whole  sample, 1900-92)  number of pateuts per year.  This makes the parameter 
in front of the term (N, 
— N5) the average annual obsolescence  rate; it is therefore directly 
comparable to the time-obsolescence  rate estimated in Column 1.  Estimating obsolescence 
based on patents rather than time improves the fit markedly, and also reduces the average 
obsolescence  rate to just over 6 percent per year. Since the number of patents is greater in 
recent years, the observed prevalence of early citations is consistent with a lower  average 
37Because the a(t,  s)  are estimated and the frequencies  differ greatly,  the  model  is  heteroskedastic.  We 
did not deal  with this problem  explicitly, but dropping the early observations  can be interpreted  as limiting 
ourselves  tu that part  of the data in  which  the  heteroskedasticity  is  likely to be  less.  The standard errors 
reported  are  heteroskedasticity  consistent,  however. 
35The sum of squared  residuals is reduced by about 30 percent. 
27 annual obsolescence rate than when the rate is held constant over time. 
The third column of the Table "frees up" the parameter  b to vary over both t and s, 
i.e., it allows  for variations in the propensity to patent over time  (while  still keeping the 
spillover potency of ideas constant over  time).  Needless  to say,  there are many  different 
ways to represent the movement in .  We explored a number of  these, and they generally 
give similar overall results. The version reported in Column 3 of Table 3.2 models 1' with a 
single  dummy for the years 1900-1919; a second dummy for 1920-1939; a third dummy for 
1940-1959; and a cubic equation in the log of I for the period 1960-1992.  This improves the 
fit further, and the parameter estimates are quite significant. The time path of y implied 
by these estimates can be seen in Figure 3.2a.  Generally speaking, the path rises over the 
century, reaching a peak somewhere  during the 1970s,  and then begins to decline.  Again, 
the patent counts have been divided by the average patents  per year so that the magnitude 
of s/ can be interpreted as the annual rate of  obsolescence created by an average year's worth 
of patents.3° 
Column 4 builds on Column 3 by freeing  up 6,.  The parameterization of 6, is parallel 
to that for tb,, with dummies for long periods early in the century and s cubic equation 
in I for the period  1960-1992.  This yields a similar pattern for  to what we had before, 
except in the  very  beginning of the century.  But  6,  moves  significantly in the opposite 
direction, as shown in Figure 3.2b, falling significantly  from the start of the century until 
about 1960,  and then leveling  off into a slower decline. As we will see below, the decline 
in 6, shown  in Figure 3.2b translates into a secular  decline in the predicted productivity of 
research, O.  In other words, knowledge  from successive  patent cohorts over the century is 
being incorporated in current patents at rates that imply that the potency of later cohorts 
in facilitating new knowledge generation is markedly less than the potency of earlier cohorts. 
Since  more recent cohorts get more weight  (they are less obsolete) in current knowledge, the 
39The numbsr  of patents per year also changes over time, of course, causiog  the variation in the yearly rate 
of obsolescence to be much  greater than the variation in ,.  See Figure 3.3. 
28 predicted effective  spillover  rate (and hence research productivity) falls over the century.4e 
As noted above, the estimate of the diffusion parameter  y is not very sensitive to these 
specification issues.  It is consistently about .7 to .8, suggesting an average lag until knowl- 
edge has diffused of between one and two years. 
For obsolescence,  it is not ',  that matters,  but rather  i,b,P1, which is equal to N'  9N. 
Figure 3.3 shows  different estimates of N', compared to the overall patent series  itself. 
What the picture shows  is that first, the variations in b over time are small relative to the 
movements in patents.  None the less, the "corrected" series does show a noticeably different 
pattern, particularly at the beginning of the century and from the end of World War II until 
the late 1970s.  In this latter period, our estimate of N' increases  almost 40 percent more 
than the patent  series itself.  After the early 1970s, ',  begins to decline,  exacerbating the fall 
in the rate of  patenting itself  that occurs between 1970 and the early 1980s.  Then patenting 
picks up again, and although ', is still falling, N' picks up as well.  In  the next subsection, 
we turn to a more detailed analysis of trends in N' versus trends in patents. 
The  last output  of the citations analysis is the construction of the series  8,, our estimate 
of the productivity of labor in research. From equation (10), 8, is the integral over  all past 
ideas q of o(t, s(q)).  We do not observe o(t, s)  but the estimated citation equation can be 
used to construct predicted values of n(t, a), using the parameters 'y, 6, and g, and the data 
series P,. This is easily done by replacing equation (13) in (12). 
Our estimate of 8, (up to a constant) is then easily obtained from a discrete representtion 
of the definition of 8:' 
8,  a(t,s),P,. 
In the formulation described above, in which ,  enters the relationship between o(t,s) and 
n'(l, a) but does not affect a(t, a) itself, the parameters gi do not enter into the construction 
'0Ose manifestation  of this pheeomenon  is the presence of fat tails in the distrihution  of the & (t, a)  '5.  This 
is not enough,  however: allowing for fat tails  in  estimation  improves the fit but it leaves — to a large extent 
— unaffected  the declining path of 6,. 
41The fact that the summation starts from 0 rather than minus infinity is empirically  irrelevant  since the 
first I  we study is sufficiently large (00) so the value of the excluded nO, a)I'J, is negligible. 
29 of o(t, s) or 9.  We also explore a variation in which we interpret  the parameters  as 
representiog something real about the use of  knowledge rather than a citation artifact. This 
will change the estimated path of O after 1975. 
Two potential estimates of O from the citation function are plotted in Figure 3.4.  The 
solid line corresponds to Column 4 of  Table 3.2, in which 8, is allowed to vary  over time.  It 
shows a dramatic fall in the predicted productivity of research labor,  very rapid from the 
1950s to the early 1970s, and then somewhat slower after that.  The heavy dashed line in 
Figure 3.4 corresponds to Column 2 of Table 3.2; that is, it holds 6,  constant over  time. 
It shows a much flatter pattern of research productivity.  In the next subsection, we will 
relate the estimated 8 to the observed productivity of research in the U.S. For now, it is 
important to emphasize that this time series is not generated from data on the productivity 
of research.  Rather, it is the model's prediclion about the path of research productivity, 
based on the pattern of old knowledge  used, as represented by citations, in the production 
of  new knowledge.  What is driving the trend is the path of 8,. In a nutshell, the citations 
data show that recent cohorts of patents  are less cited than older ones (controlling for ob- 
solescence),  suggesting that they are less potent in generating spillovers.  Since obsolescence 
makes recent patents more important in the overall stock, the current stock is less potent 
overall than the stock that was available to previous inventors. With shorter shoulders to 
stand on, current inventors have to spend more on telescopes in order to see as far as their 
predecessors did. 
Note that the estimated decline in O is conditional on our assumption that the parameter 
ô, captures only citation behavior and not any change in the actual use of old knowledge.  If, 
on the other hand, one believed that the increase in the raw citation rate that can be seen 
in the data is a real (exogenous)  increase in the use of old knowledge,  then we would expect 
this increase to feed through into rising research productivity. It seems likely, a priori, that 
the large increase io citation intensities reflects primarily a change  in citation practices. In 
additioo, as  we will show below, actual research productivity shows oo evideoce  of  iocreasiog 
after 1975 as would be predicted if  0, were rising steeply. 
30 3.3  Tn INNOVATION PRODUCTION FUNCTION 
Equation (8) above describes the production of  innovations as a function of  the research labor 
force L and a research productivity function or paranseter 8.  In the previous subsection 
we  have  developed a method for constructing an estimate of 8 based on the  "use" as 
evidenced by  citations,  of older knowledge.  In this subsection we will  incorporate this 
estimate into estimates of the innovation function itself.42  We  estimate the innovation 
function on aggregate time series for patents and two measures of research inputs 
— 
spending and research scientists and engineers 
—  for the period 1957 to 1989.  If the data 
and model are interpreted literally, equation (8) leaves large serially correlated disturbances 
unexplained. Orre possibility is to correct for  serial correlation, leaving this dynamic pattern 
in the disturbance unexplained. Another possibility is to modify the theory so innovations 
are a direct function of  current and lagged  research. Doing the latter modifies our model only 
slightly if the lagged research that matters is the aggregate one, while it makes the theory 
more cumbersome if lagged research is private. From the point of  view of  estimation in this 
section, however,  this distinction does not matter.  Moreover,  this common specification 
is indistinguishable from a third explanation where the serially  correlated disturbance is 
attributed to the timing of research, innovation and patenting.  We explain and adopt the 
latter, but it should be clear that we have  no strong position on the relative importance of 
these sources of serial correlation. 
/Te will treat the fundamental innovation equation (8) as holding with respect to unob- 
served  new ideas. These ideas do not, however, lead instantaneously to patent  applications. 
Rather, patent applications P2 are given by: 
= ot  = (1-p)'i 
Thus,  as  above,  we allo;v for a time- varying propensity to patent or  proportionality 
42We will  also sse the estimates of  from  the  previoas  subsection  to convert patents to N'. Given the 
large inflow of foreign patents,  this is likely to underestimate  the change in sire of U.S. patents, for on average 
there will be more inventions  in  between subsequent  U.S. patents. 
31 constant between ideas and patents;  we call this il' and we will use the estimates from the 
previous subsection to convert P2 to N2°6.  In addition, however,  we allow for lags in the 
conversion of ideas into patent applications. We will estimate these lags, parameterized by 
p  from the innovation function itself.  We  take the actual productivity parameter,  O, to 
depend on the 8 estimated above and exogenous research productivity:  8, = 
7)o + rii8t. The 
parameters '/s and ,j, will also be estimated from the innovation function. 
Note that  patents are not actually granted until some later date, usually within 2 to 3 
years of application but occasionally much later.  Because  this second lag is variable and 
results from the  vagaries  of the patent office, we estimate the innovation function using 
patents  by year'of application.43  This is in contrast to our construction of 8,,  and the 
knowledge  diffusion analysis more generally, which used patents by grant year.  This was 
prcdicated on the assumption that knowledge  does not begin to spread until the patent is 
actually granted.  This  seems  plausible, since patent applications are secret.  Only when 
the patent is granted is the technical knowledge  contained in them published.  We should 
note, however, that we will look  below at the response of firms' market value to (ultimately 
successful)  patent applications. We are implicitly assuming that, at the time of  application, 
the market knows  that an idea has been generated, and responds to that  knowledge,  even 
though its technical content is still secret. 
We estimate the innovation function using measures of  U.S. research inputs, and a mea- 
sure of U.S. patents. Again, this differs  from the previous subsection where, though  we 
are using "patents in the U.S.," we include patents  granted in the U.S. to foreigners in N. 
This means that, in estimating the relationship between U.S. research and U.S. patents, we 
include in the spillover function 8, all patents,  not just U.S. patents. Thus we are assuming 
that U.S. research produces U.S. inventions, but it draws upon (and is made obsolete by) 
worldwide  inventions. 
It is well known that the productivity of  research, as measured by patent output, shows 
a long-term decline from the 1950s until the mid-l9SOs  (Griliches (1989);  I'Cortum (1993)). 
43This is th€ standard practice  in the patent literatnre. See e.g., Ilausman, flail and Griliches (1984) 
32 This is shown  in Figure 3.5.  The top panel shows the ratio of patents to several measures 
of research input; the bottom  panel plots N', that is  times patents.  The patent series  is 
total "U.S. priority" patents,44  by year of  application. The research input measures include 
real non- government R&D expenditures and total research scientists and engineers, as 
well  as each of these scaled by  U.S. population,45 and nominal R&D scaled by nominal 
expenditure.  Explanations that have been put forward for the downward trend in patent 
productivity include (1) an exogenous  fall in "technological opportunity;"  (2)  aggregate 
decreasing returns to research, producing a fall in  average  productivity because research 
has risen significantly; and (3) a decline in the propensity to patent (Kortum (1993)). 
Our estimates from the previous section shed significant  light on these issues. First, as 
can be  seen  from Figure 3.5  (as well as Figure 3.3), correcting for patent size using the 
estimated ,  does mitigate the fall in productivity up until 1970.  Thereafter, unfortunately, 
the estimated eJ, begins to fall, aggravating the apparent fall in productivity. Our estimates 
for 9, do, however,  provide an explanation for much of the overall trend in patent produc- 
tivity.  This can he seen from Figure 3.5, in which the estimated 9, is plotted along with the 
observed productivity. In both panels, it is clear that the overall downward movement in 9, 
is quite consistent with the fall in research productivity, though it does not explain the high- 
frequency movements,  including the precipitous drop in the late 1970s and the rapid rise in 
very recent  years. In the terms of the previously offered explanations for the fall in patent 
productivity, our estimates suggest that "technological opportunity" has indeed fallen.  In 
our model this takes the form of decreased usefulness of the stock of existing knowledge in 
generating new ideas.46  The previous section  shows  that this fall can he observed in the 
pattern  of actual use of older knowledge,  as evidenced by patent  citations. 
44This means thst the patent was applied  for in the U.S. before being applied for anywhere else in the world. 
iSCivilian population  over the age of 16  (1991 Economir  Report  of the President) 
45Note that the fi shown in Figure 3.5 is the one that results when we treat the increase in i  as an artifact 
of citation practices rather than a real phenomenon.  On one hand, the close correspondence of the resulting  0, 
to measured productivity  provides  further support to our conjecture  that the movements in ', are not "real." 
On  the other band, if this is  wrong and the "abnormal"  trend in  citations  corresponds  to a trae increase in 
spiliovers, our measure  of 0 exacerbates rather than eliminates  the  patent/R&D ratio purrle, at least outil 
1986. 
33 Figure 3.5 suggests that the estimated 8, explains much of the observed trend in patent 
productivity. To push this a little further, we estimate the equation:47 
= ae + (1 
— 
p)U,R, + PA',_,, 
with R, a measure of research input  and 
= 
Tic, + '7i8t. 
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 3.3.  The columns correspond to different 
measures of  research input. In column 1, we use research scientists and engineers. The fit is 
quite good, and the estimates are all reasonable and statistically significant.  As suggested 
above, 8 is highly significant.  The next column uses research scientists and engineers as a 
fraction of the population.  The fit is approximately the same, and the role of 8, is smaller 
but still positive and significant.  In the next three columns we report results for research 
input measured as real R&D expenditure, and R&D expenditure divided by consumption 
and population, respectively. Except for unscaied R&D  (where the signs are correct but the 
coefficients are not significant), the results are similar to those obtained with scientists and 
engineers. 
Thus the regression results confirm what can be seen in the pictures, that our estimated 
decline  in 8,, inferred from patent citations, "explains" much of the secular decline in mea- 
sured patent productivity.  In interpreting this, we must consider the factors determining 
the almost monotonic decline  in 8 through our sample period.  First,  there is the decline 
in 5, indicating a reduction in the usefulness of successive  cohorts of ideas in generating 
spillovers  to the creation of new ideas.48  In principle, there is a second force potentially 
4mWe also estimated versions allowing for decreasing returns with respect to research ioput. The standard 
specification  with  decreasing  returns hut q = 0 was uniformly  and very significantly  outperformed  by the 
linear  model with q' unrestricted.  Adding  decreasing  returns to the model with  'h  unrestricted yielded 
unrealistically  low and very imprecise estimates  of the returns to scale parameter. 
48The empirical  regularity  is that the  citations to early patents are more frequent  than would be expected 
based on the estimated  rate of exponential  obsolescence.  We interpret this in terms oft, having heen larger in 
34 at work; 9 is constructed using all  patents, not just U.S.  patents.  The fraction  of U.S. 
patents going to foreigners rose from about 11 percent in 1957 to about 44 percent in 1989. 
Fom the point of  view of U.S. inventors, this increase in foreign  patenting in the U.S. has 
the effect  of speeding up the "N clock"  without affecting  the "time clock."  New  ideas are 
coming faster in the aggregate, making it harder for any inventor to take a step, and much 
of this new  knowledge  is too recent to have  diffused and thereby spilled over to helping new 
invention. 
The top panel of  Figure 3.6 shows  that it is actually only the decline in S. that mattered. 
The solid line shows what 8 would have  looked like if S. had been constant; it is itself quite 
constant.  The Figure also shows  why the increase in N' due  to foreign patenting did not 
matter; the rate of  knowledge diffusion is fast enough so that the spillovers  from this influx 
roughly  halanced the increased obsolescence.  This can be seen from the dashed line, which 
shows  what 9 would  have  looked  like if y were much smaller, i.e.  .001. In that case,  we 
would  havc  had a marked decline in  O  even  if S had been constant.  The bottom panel 
reproduces these two cases for the actual (declining) path of 5,.  It shows that, if y had 
been smaller, there would have  been an additional downward effect on productivity from 
the influx of  foreign patenting.  But, given the actual y, this effect is small; diffusion  is close 
enough to instantaneous that we are, in effect, in the world described in Section 2.3 in which 
S does not depend on N. 
3.4  N AND  GROWTH 
As shown in equation (21),the theoretical model predicts an extremely simple linear relation- 
ship between the growth rate of consumption and N. Casual inspection of the data makes 
clear that such a relationship does not hold for annual data in the U.S. The high frequency 
movements in these series are not likely to be well explained by a growth model. Therefore, 
the early years.  Alternatively,  one could say that the true obsolescence functiou  is "slower" than exposential, 
i.e., the  citation distributions  have  fatter tails than predicted  by exponential  ohsolescence.  Either way, the 
effect  is similar;  we would predict a decline in the effective spillover base  as  knowledge accumulates. 
35 to explore whether  we can find evidence  of the predicted relationship,  we smoothed both 
time series by using predicted values from a regression of the actual series on a filth- order 
polynomial in the log of time.  The top panel of Figure 3.7 shows the resulting smoothed 
consumption growth rate and N, using the same U.S. priority patent series, corrected by 
the estimated  from the citation data.  The shapes are strikingly similar, especially con- 
sidering that it is not clear that one can expect consumption, as actually measured in the 
National Income Accounts, to move as predicted by the model.49 
Given the previous discussion, it is not clear how seriously  one should take precise timing 
issues.  For completeness, however,  we mention that the N series  appears to be displaced 
forward by 1 or 2 years up until the early 1980s.  This suggests either that new ideas  are 
incorporated in new products  even before the date of patent application, or, perhaps more 
likely, that both series are moved  by other shocks  but exhibit different dynamic responses 
to these. 
From equations (2) and (4) it is possible to write: 
C  N,  _ir 
f{J'(q)e9}0dq 
but since 
N,  N 
fL'(q)dq  = L  — 
and 
L,(q) = 
45The essence of  technological  chsnge in this model is the introduction  of  new goods.  As has been emphasired 
by Griliches  (1979) and others, the  extent to which the statistics capture the increase  in  consumption  that 
occurs when new goods are introduced  varies greatly across industries. The authorities measure revenues,  not 
output, and convert  revenues to output using price deflatora that generally  ignore the quality improvement  associated  with new goods. 
36 we can express the rate of growth  of  consumption as:50 
+ N: -  A (i-). 
We estimated the following empirical version of this equation: 
a1=Ae+AsI_A2A(f). 
The coefficient A2 was never significant so we omit the lsst term in the regressions reported 
below  in Table 3.4. Columns 1 and 2 present results for the growth rate of  consumption, with 
and without a serial correlation correction. Columns 3 and 4 present the same results using 
the growth rate of lahor productivity instead of  consumption as the dependent variable. All 
versions  tell a similar story. The coefficient on N' is about  .5 to .6 and significant.51. 
The bottom panel of Figure 3.7 shows the (smoothed) growth rate of labor productivity 
(CNP over employment), and thc "true" N that can he derived from  N°5 using the estimated 
parameters front the innovation equation.  Again, the movements are very  closely related. 
Though we stress that the lag we have incorporated between the true and observed N is 
something of a black box, the model does seem  to do a good job at predicting the longer 
term movements in the productivity series. 
3.5  CREATIVE  DESTRUCTION 
All of the previous empirical subsections can be thought of as  conditional on the path of 
research. In the model, the allocation of labor to research is determined by the value of  new 
ideas, whose time path is given by equation (5), the "creative destruction" equation. In this 
subsection, we present some empirical estimates of that equation. 
50For this we use the approximation  In (1 
— a)  —x, fcr r small. 
stAll coefficients appear significant  but our transformation  introduces  large hisses in  the  standard errors, 
so these should not be taken too  seriously.  Agaio,  we only emphusire  the coincidence in  the  general shape  of 
the curves in Figure 3.7. 
37 As noted above, estimation of this equation requires confronting the notion of  firms.  It 
also  requires identifying the concept of sectors, which have  not  been explicitly described 
in the models but whose dynamic properties can be easily understood by extension of the 
results from the single sector model.  We will treat firms as agglomerations of blueprints, 
though we will not seek to explain why any particular firm holds the particular portfolio of 
blueprints that Ft does.52  We will assign  firms to sectors, which will be defined as groups 
of firms whose research activities have historically focussed on similar areas.  With these 
assumptions, we can derive a version of the creative destruction equation that relates the 
deviations from the sector mean in firms' value growth rates to the deviations from the 
mean of the firms' N. 
Let  P123  .&, and .2)',, represent the  value  of a firm r in sector s, the value of the entire 
sector, and the value of the firms in sector s that are included  in the sample; all of them at 
time t and in terms of units of  consumption. Letting A1(q) and wg,(q) be indicator functions, 
we have: 
= I-: A1(q)V2(q) dq, 
=  w,(q)  172(q) dq, 
=  Vi(q)dq. 
Differentiating these expressions with respect to time, using equation  (5),  letting  N12,  as 
A1(N24N23, and assuming w23(q) as w23, we obtain our basic estimating equation:53 
52Although  this definition  of firms  is  consistent  with the  non-excludability  of knowledge  implicit  in  the 
model, it is unlikely to hold  true in  reality.  In  other  words, research  know-how, organizational  capital and 
other forms of private knowledge must add value to a firm  beyond  the value of its  patents. 
53An alternative derivation  of the same equation  can be obtained by letting A1(N,,) he a raodom variable 
independent acrosn i, so the best predictor  of its  realization  is the share of the  firma value in  the lodustry. 
Also, assuming  that each sector is comprised  of a large number of firms, the total number of new patents in 
the industry together  with its chaoge in value can be taken as known io advance (or at least uncertainty about 
these can be assumed to be negligible relative  to the same concepts at the firm  level). 
38 -  Ii's = A1 
[ic' - 
where 
a  1 
1  — a 
We estimate equation (15)  on an unbalanced panel of  firms from the NBER R&D panel 
(Hall, et al (1988)), which contains Compustat financial information and U.S. patent data. 
The assignment of these firms to technological sectors is described in Jaffe (1986). Briefly, 
the distribution of the finns' patents across patent  classes  for  the period 1965-1972 was used 
in a multinomial clustering algorithm to identify groups  of firms with "similar" patent class 
distributions. The 567 firms are assigned  to a total of 21  sectors. Simple statistics for the 
sectors are presented in Table 3.5.  In  general level of  aggregation the sectors are comparable 
to  2 to  3 digit SIC industries.  The assignment is made, however,  on the basis of areas of 
inventive activity rather than sales. 
To estimate equation (15), we need to parameterize the variation in the parameter  A31 
over s and i. This parameter encompasses variations in the CES parameter a, in the share  of 
the sector represented by the firms in the sample,  and also variations in the proportionality 
factor between patents and new ideas. We treat it as the product of a sector-specific  constant 
and a  cubic polynomial in t.  We constrain A to be positive by using an exponential time 
polynomial.54  Although equation (13) implies  that  the two terms in square brackets are 
constrained to have the same coefficient  A0, we allow a free parameter on the sector patent 
total N.  We also allow for year- and sector-  specific  intercepts, leading to the equation 
actually estimated: 
— I  = a0 + A1A, [i14c±- 
— 
The  results of estimating  this equation on  8457 observations are presented  in Table 
541f we do not constraint  these estimates  to be positive we obtaia negative estimate  at the end of the sample, 
although  these are insignificant.  The overall fit wss statistically  anaffected by our non-negativity  constraint. 
39 3.6.  The coefficients  A,  are  generally positive,  though many are not  significant.55  The 
parameter  p  which should be unity if the proportionality (implied by the model) between 
value and patents  holds, is about 1.4. This says that firm patents  scaled by the ratio of  firm 
to sector value averages less than sector patents.  This is consistent with the general and 
intuitive finding that large firms have proportionally fewer patents than small firms.56  The 
parameters P5  P2 and P3 in the table are the coefficients of the cubic time polynomial for 
To interpret these results, we use the parameter estimates to calculate rates of creative 
destruction. The most straightforward way to do this is to multiply the estimated  A35 times 
the estimated p times the number of patents in the sector in each year.  Doing this yields 
estimates of the rate of creative destruction by sector by year. The average over the sample 
years  of these numbers are presented in the last column ef Table 3.5.  They range from 
essentially zero  for a number of sectors, including computers, to a high of 25 percent per 
year for drugs.  The (unweighted) average across all sectors is  about 3.5 percent per year. 
Some aspects of these results  are  quite consistent with previous findings.  In particular, 
the very high rate of creative destruction for drugs is consistent with the general view 
that this is a very progressive sector and one in which patents are a very good measure of 
technical advance (Mansfield  (1986); Levin et al (1987)). We also find relatively fast creative 
destruction as measured by patents in machinery, electrical equipment and communications 
equipment.  These are  all  sectors where patents are reasonably important.  In contrast, 
our inability to find creative destruction in computers is probably related to the relative 
unimportance of patents in that sector (Bound, et al;  Levin et al), rather than a low rate 
of technological change. 
We can also look at variations over time. Again, the most straightforward way to do this 
is to simply multiply the estimated A,5 and p times the yearly sectoral patent  total.  If we do 
this, and average over sectors, we get the path shown in Figure 3.8.  Beginning at a high of 
55The time and sector intercepts  are not generally significant. 
55See, e.g., Bound, et al (1984). 
40 about 7 percent in 1965,  creative  destruction falls quickly into the range of 3 to 4 percent, 
and then falls close  to zero at the end of the sample period in 1981.  There is, however, 
reason not  to take the time variation in total patents in these data too seriously. First, it 
is affected by the changing firm composition in the unbalanced panel.  In addition,  total 
patents in this sample fall precipitously in 1980  and  1981, because of the way the dataset 
was created.57  For these reasons, the very low rates at the end of the sample period should 
probably be ignored. 
4  GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM, CALIBRATION, AND 
IMPLICATIONS OF  THE  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
In  the previous section we used the basic  structure of the growth model presented in 
Section 2 to guide our search for empirical manifestations of  creative destruction and knowl- 
edge  spillovers. In this section we go back to the model itself and examine its properties, 
using the estimates obtained in the empirical section for the parameter values. The primary 
purpose of this section is simply to explore the static and dynamic behavior of the model 
using reasonable parameter values. We will also, however, go a little further and examine 
some strong positive and normative conjectures that arise from the behavior of the model 
when calibrated with the empirical parameter values. 
In Section 2 we identified the following  key parameters:  p, cs  6, L, -y and .  Section 3 
provides estimates  of a, -y,  and fi, as well as of  changes in 8 (but not its level) and in a over 
time. Initially, we focus our attention  on the average value of the parameters, and postpone 
the discussion of the impact  of changes in parameters  until later in this section.  We set 
the discount rate, p, to o03,se and use average U.S. consumption growth together  with the 
'7Recall that the data is patents by year of application.  Because the dataset was created in 1982,  some 
ultimately successful  applications  from 1980 and  1981 had not yet  been granted, leading  to a systematic 
undercount  in those years. 
Qualitative cooclusions are not affected by other  "reasonable"  assumptions about the discount rate, p. 
41 steady state of the model to calibrate S and .t. In order to calibrate these parameters, we 
first need to go back  to the model itself  and characterize its equilibrium. 
The dynamical system that emerges from the model  described in Section 2 has a range 
of  parameters for which innovation is unprofitable so growth does not occur. We focus our 
analysis on cased where steady state growth is strictly positive. 
From the innovation function, labor market equilibrium and free entry conditions, we 
obtain an expression for the rate of innovation as a function of the productivity of labor in 
research and of the value of the leading idea in units of  consumption: 
(17) 
Replacing this in the valuation equation (5), yields the dynamic equatioo for V  as a function 
of itself and B: 
(  -\  a 
(18)  \  1—a  /  1—a 
Finally, the  dynamic  equation  for  labor productivity in research  is obtained by differentiating 
(10) with respect to time: 
which combined with (17) yields: 
(19) 
Equations (18) and (19), together with initi conditions on 8 and a transversality condi- 
tion, form a self-contained  dynamical system. After solving for the paths of 8 aod l'  from 
this system, the rate of innovation can be recovered from equation (17). 
Since we found large values of  — i.e. a high speed of  diffusion of ideas — in the previous 
section, it is convenient to first characterize the case where diffusion  is infinitely fast; this 
is a good approximation and it has the advantage of ao extremely simple set of dynamic 
42 equations. 
If there are no lags in the diffusion of knowledge, the system has no transitional dynamics.59 
As shown  in Section 2, in this case  = S//3; which by (18) and the transversalitv condition 
implies:  a  1  V=x  -. 
1—a 
while the rate of innovation is: 
(20) 
and  consumption growth is: 
(21) 
These expressions  provide a simple setup to understand the main role of a. .  /3 and p in 
determining the equilibrium valuation of new ideas, knowledge  spillovers  and the economy's 
rate of growth:6° 
DV  pV2  ON  N  3  / oN  \  N 
—=———>0;  —=————-<0;  —(————=—-—>0,  (22a)  Do  a2  Da  1—a  Da\1—a)  1—a 
DV  fi DV  LV2  ON  ON  (1 
— a)L >0  (92b  D  /38/9  /3 
'  08  /33/9  /9 
DV  (1—a)V2  511 
<0;  —=--(1—a)<0.  (22c) 
op  a  op 
When the degree of substitutability among goods  (a) rises, the value (per unit of con- 
sumption) of a new idea rises.  - This may seem surprising since an increase in a lowers the 
59Obviously, anticipated changes will lead to non-steady  state dynamics.  The absence  of transitional dy- 
namics  refers to  the  response  of the  system to a once and foe  all  unexpected  change in a constant of  the 
model.  - 
600ne  could  also study the impact of L, but we take this as a nuisance  parameter. It is at best unclear 
which is  the  appropriate  normalization. 
43 markup charged by firms.  There are, however,  three other effects that must be considered. 
First, as discussed in Section 2, the fall in the markup is outweighed by an increase in the 
size of the market faced by new ideas (the "scope effect'), so that the initial profit of the 
newest idea  rises with a. Second,  an increase in a raises creative destruction, which reduces 
expected future proflts and hence the initial value of ideas.  Third,  it can be shown that 
from these effects alone, the ratio of the value to the wage would fall.61  From the free entry 
condition, this would  be inconsistent with positive invention. Therefore, there must be an 
endogenous decline in creative destruction (fall in N) in order to offset the fall in the value 
to wage ratio.62 
The impact of an increase in the potency of  spillovers  (6) as well as that of a reduction 
in the technological destructiveness of new ideas () is shown in equation (22b).  They 
increase the pace of innovation, and through the impact  of this on creative destruction, 
lower the equilibrium value of new ideas.52  Finally, equation (22c) shows that an increase 
in consumers' impatience, p, lowers both the value of new ideas and the rate of invention 
through standard discounting and savings  mechanisms. 
Although the intuition as well as the sign of the relations described above survive the 
introduction  of a finite 7'  it is worth describing briefly the implications of  frictions in the 
diffusion of ideas. 
If 'p is finite, the system exhibits transitional dynamics since  "the clocks have to  syn- 
chronize to the new pace."  That is, if information diffuses  slowly,  "shocks"  that lead to 
changes in N disrupt the balance between technological obsolescence and increases in the 
51An important mechanism behind the monotonic relation  between  growth and markups  is that labor  sopply  is completely  inelastic.  If this assumption  is relaxed, then as the wage falls (i.e.  markopa  rise) there seooid be  a reduction in resources  available and, under the appropriate  fonctional  assumptions,  an  eventoal  decline in 
equilibrium growth. 
521n the y finite case, the eadogenous decline in creative destruction  would not completely  offset the initial 
decline in the value to wage ratio. 
53Alternatively, the fall in equilibrium  value can be explained  in term of the increase in the productivity  of 
research.  This and the  creative destruction interpretations  of the decline in  value are related in  equilibrium 
by the free entry condition. 
e4Thl5 is particularly  true for large values of y, as is the one estimated  in the empirical  section. 
44 base of knowledge.  Transitional dynamics occur while the new level of 9 that restores this 
balance is reached. Before discussing  dynamics, however,  it is worth pausing to study the 
steady state and to calibrate the remaining parameters using average  U.S. growth data. 
The steady sate can be found in closed form, although the equations are somewhat less 
informative than before: 





It is apparent from these equations that using average growth data only (which we do 
here), it is neither possible nor relevant to separate L from 6; thus we set  L = 1.  We can 
now recover all the parameters of the model, which are summarized in Table 4.1. In words, 
we obtained -y = 0.7 directly from the citation function, and /3 = 1.67 is the inverse of the 
coefficient on the change in the number of ideas, as normalized in the citation function, in 
the growth equation. We recover  cv  from the average of our creative destruction estimates, 
0.035,  which corresponds to aN/(l  — a), and the average  of N, 0.042. The estimate  of n 
so obtained is 0.463.  The last parameter, 6, is obtained from the steady state equilibrium 
equation fbr N (equation 23b) and is equal to 0.199. 
Figure 4.la plots the steady-state  growth  rate for an economy  with the same base pa- 
rameters of the U.S. and a range of values of cs  the index of creative destruction, and 6, 
the spillover potency index, that contain the U.S. values. Figure 4.lh does the same for the 
equilibrium value/consumption ratio.  U.S.  "average"  equilibrium is depicted by a black dot 
65For this we use that N = N'°5//3, and N'  = 0.07.  Our sample  for the estimate of creative destruction 
is  1965-1981, while we use the period  1960-1989 to compute  the  average change  in  ideas. 
45 in each figure. 
One of our main empirical findings is that productivity of  labor in research has declined 
sharply over the sample, and this seems to be mostly due to a decline in 8.  According to 
figure 4.1, this ought to lower the equilibrium rate of  innovation, N, and raise  the value of a 
new patent to consumption ratio, V.  On the other hand, our empirical evidence on creative 
destruction suggests that a has decreased over time; this should raise N and V. 
Splitting the sample into two periods,  1960-74  and  1975-89,  associating the 1965-74 
and 1975-81  averages of creative destruction to each of these periods, respectively,ee  we 
can calculate the model's predicted steady-state changes in N and V.  We find that  the 
effect of the decline in the power of spillovers  dominates the effect of the decline in creative 
destruction on equilibrium growth, leading to a prediction that N should have fallen by 
about 50 percent from the first to the second periods. With respect to value, both of these 
effects go in the same direction, leading to a predicted increase of about  25 percent in the 
value to consumption ratio. 
In reality, N (the patent  series adjusted by our estimated ')  fell about 15 percent.  If we 
proxy the value to consumption ratio by the ratio of stock prices to nominal consumption, 
we find an  actual rise in  V of about 20 percent.67  Thus the qualitative predictions of the 
model are  confirmed,  though the actual magnitudes changed less than the model implies 
they should have. 
We conclude this section by briefly addressing several  issues  that are tangential to our 
main concerns: (i) a description of the transitional dynamics of the model; (ii) the long run 
effect of changes in the speed of diffusion of ideas () and in technological destructiveness 
(fi); and (iii) optimal R&D subsidy rates. 
Figure 4.2 shows the phase diagram corresponding to a case with non-instantaneous dif- 
55Remember that the sample used to estimate  the path of creative destruction  goes from 1965 to 1981  only.  57Thsre ars several  reasons  to think that an  index of aggregate stock prices is not a great proxy for the 
value of patents. In particular, ths number of patents a firm bus is  likely to be an  important component  of 
the value of its stock and, for the experiments  we discuss hers, value and number of patents at. the firm level 
are likely to be negatively  correlated. 
46 fusion. Point A corresponds to a steady state equilibrium with the parameter configuration 
of the 1960-74 period described above, while point B illustrates the steady state emerging 
from the 1975-89 period. The thick line with srrows illustrates the saddle path of the new 
equilibrium. Since in reality the shift in parameters may have been slow and the decline in 
6 seems to have compromised only newer cohorts,  it seems unreasonable to assume that the 
actual dynamics can be characterized in terms of the new saddle path. Instead, a path like 
the one depicted by the thin line with arrows seems more likely. 
Figure 4.3. illustrates the long run effect of changes  in the speed of diffusion  of ideas (-y) 
and in technological destructiveness (fi), with the black dots representing the steady state 
of an economy with the parameter  values we found for the U.S.  It shows  that  'y is large, 
in the sense that further increases in it do not  increase equilibrium growth significantly. 
An increase in the destructiveness parameter fl  by lowering the equilibrium productivity of 
labor in research, reduces equilibrium growth and raises the required value of a new idea. 
Finally, we address the optimal subsidy issue,  focussing on the case where y — cc.  We 
also assume that the subsidy to labor used in research is financed with a tax on labor used 
in production of consumption goods. 
Setting L =  = 1, and letting s be the subsidy rate (in terms of units of consumption). 
it can be shown that in equilibrium, N is: 
(24) 
which is clearly maximized as a  —*  1.  As always,  however,  there is a tradeoff between long 
run growth and current consumption. Indeed: 
___  aS 
6(1-s) +))C 
.  La) 
58Note  that the initial jump in ü is  possible only if the initial  change ia  involves the poteacy of older 
patents. 
47 which, for given N5, is decreasing with respect to s, and reaches zero when s = a.  Since the 
utility function is logarithmic, the optimal subsidy rate must he less than a. 
Since we have assumed that exogenous  technological  progress is negligible,  we have that 
Cs = N, so we can write the present-value utility of the representative agent, U5, as: 
U5 = ln  Ca + 
Pt.  P 
Maximizing this equation with respect to s,  subject to equations (24)  and (25), yields the 
optimal subsidy rate, s: 
* —  cs2(6//3 
— p) 
p+a(8/—2p) 
Replacing the parameters calibrated in the previous subsection, yields an  optimal subsidy 
rate of 33% if p = 0.03.  Turning back to equation (24), such subsidy rate almost  doubles 
the rate of growth of an unsubsidized economy characterized by the parameters  calibrated 
for the U.S..55 
5  CoNcLusioN 
We have constructed a model of  economic growth through the  creation of  new goods, in 
which the phenomena of creative destruction and knowledge  spillovers  play prominent roles. 
The model has fairly simple and intuitive relationships between the existing public stock of 
knowledge and  new ideas, between new ideas and growth, and between grotvth and the value 
of ideas or blueprints.  The model  produces endogenous growth for appropriate parameter 
values, and it highlights the importance of the speed of  diffusion of  existing knowledge and 
the endogenous rate of knowledge  obsolescence. 
ttThs optimal sohsidy  rate experiment  raises the issue os whether  oor ralibratioa exercise should he cor- 
rected to consider  the  fact that la the  U.S. the subsidy rate  is aos-sero.  We  do aot think that the  precise 
oumbers  should  be  taken that literally. 
48 We implemented the model empirically using patents  as proxies for new ideas. First, we 
showed that it is possible to use patent citation information to put a fairly rich structure of 
knowledge  diffusion  and knowledge  obsolescence  onto the notion of research spillovers. We 
find that the rate of  knowledge  nbsolescence  rose frnm about 2 or 3 percent per year early in 
the century to about 10-12 percent per year at the end of the 1980s.  Our results show that 
the process of knowledge  diffusion  is quite rapid; indeed sufficiently  rapid  that  the model 
performs essentially as  if diffusion were instantaneous.  In  this context it is important to 
note that the lag we are measuring is between the grant date of the cited patent and the 
grant date of the citing patent.  It seems plausible to view diffusion  as beginning with the 
patent grant, since that is when the patent information is public. But the grant date of the 
citing patent is, of course,  several  months to a few years after its application date, and we 
take application date as being associated with invention. Thus, from the grant date of the 
cited patent to the application date of the citing patent would be even a  shorter lag.  Our 
results on the speed of diffusion seem to be broadly consistent with earlier work, particularly 
that of Mansfield (1985), who found that 70 perccut of product iruiovations  were known  and 
understood by rivals within 12 months of the innovation, and only 17 percent took longer 
than 18 months. 
This rapid diffusion rate prevented the large influx  of foreign patenting in the U.S. in 
recent decades from lowering  U.S. R&D productivity even further: with diffusion this rapid. 
the spillovers  from the foreign  knowledge  creation approximately balance the increased rate 
of knowledge  obsolescence  that they also create. 
This "good news" is overshadowed, however, by a measured reduction in the usefulness 
of existing public knowledge  in generating new  knowledge.  as reflected in citation patterns. 
The estimated spillover potency (6) fell by a factor of 5 over the century. with roost of this 
occurring in the first few decades,  and a fall of about  25  percent  in the post-war period. 
When we translate  this into  the change in effective accumulated public knowledge,  we predict 
a fall in the private productivity  of research inputs of about 30 percent  between the late 
1950s and 1990. 
49 We then move to the estimation of the innovation production function, the relationship 
between aggregate U.S. private research inputs  and aggregate U.S. idea generation, as rep- 
resented by U.S. patents. We confront the well-known  "puzzle"  of the large fall in the ratio 
of U.S. patents to U.S. research inputs in the post-war period. The citation function esti- 
mation  could,  potentially, explain this in 2 ways.  If the size of patents was increasing fast 
enough, then the idea/research-input ratio may not be falling even if the patent/research- 
input ratio is. Second, if the effective stock of  public knowledge  is falling, then the reduced 
spillovers  would explain the fail in the productivity of private research inputs.  We find 
evidence  of both effects, although the increase in patent size peaks in the early  1970s.  so 
that our ideas/research-input ratio actually falls faster than the patent/research-input  ratio 
after that.  For the entire 1958-1990 period, we can explain the overall patent-productivity 
trend quite well, but we do not explain the accelerated decline  in research productivity that 
occurred in the late 1970s,  nor the apparent reversal of the trend in the mid  l9SOs.  One 
difficulty with understanding the very recent movements is that these patents have not had 
much time to be cited, so our estimates of both 8 and  are very imprecise for the late 
1980s.  Given the large increases in the number of patents  in this period, it \vill be interesting 
to see how these patents  fare as time goes by. 
As noted, we also found evidence that the "size"  of patents  has grown over the century, 
increasing by a factor of 3  from 1900 until 1940,  and then by an additional  20 percent 
until it peaked in about  1970.  This is consistent with previous conjectures about changes 
in the propensity to patent.  The early rise, in particular, is probably traceable to changes 
in the legal treatment of patents and the "corporatization" of research.  (See Sehmookler 
(1966).)  It may also  be that innovation has become more "systems" oriented as it has 
become increasingly science-based,  so that each "invention" is actually a larger and larger 
package of component ideas.  It is also interesting that we find the  size of patents to he 
falling in recent years. There are two major  institutional  changes  in the 1980s that might 
have  been expected to affect the propensity to patent, in opposite directions. First, patent 
application fees were increased, and fees for patent renewal were instituted for the first 
50 time in the U.S. in 1981.  These  changes  should have operated to increase the threshold for 
inventors to decide to make a patent application, reducing the propensity to patent.  At 
approximately the same time, there has been  a perceived increase in the strength  of patent 
enforcement in the U.S. This makes patents more valuable and should thereby increase the 
propensity to patent.  Our results suggest that the latter effect  may he empirically more 
important.7° 
Next we looked  at the relationship between the rate of idea creation and consumption 
or productivity growth.  We  showed  that, after removing high-frequency movements, the 
growth rates of either consumption or labor productivity display movements over the last 
several  decades that correlate quite closely  with the rate of invention that we measured. 
Thus in our model the productivity  slowdown  — the long fall in the smoothed growth rate 
of productivity from the mid 1960s — can be traced back to a fall in the rate of  new product 
creation, which itself can be traced to a  fall in research productivity connected to a decrease 
in the potency of old knowledge  in generating new  ideas. 
The coincidence in timing of the fall in patenting in the  1970s and the slowdown in 
aggregate productivity has been noted by others.  We  have a story consistent with those 
facts, but  we cannot push it too  hard because so many of our assumptions about lags 
between observables and unobservables cannot be tested. 
Our final empirical innovation is the measurement of rates of creative destruction, using 
data on patents and value at the firm and sectoral level. Unfortunately, these estimates can 
only be made for a shorter time period in the  1960s and 1970s,  because the construction 
of patent totals for these firms in the  1980s has not been carried out.  This  exercise  does 
give reasonable estimates for many sectors, varying between 0 for Petroleum Refining and 
25 percent per year for Drugs, with a mean of about 3.5 percent per year.  The estimated 
time path of the average rate of creative destruction is some\vhat surprising, falling  from a 
high of 7 percent in the mid-60s towards zero by 1981.  A challenge  for futurc work will be 
75As can  be  seen from  Figure 3.5,  there has been a large iscresse is the  patest/research ratio is the  late 
1980s.  This woald also suggest a possible rise in the propessity  to palest (fall  in  the size of patests). 
51 to try to find alternative data series that would permit a richer analysis of rates of creative 
destruction by sector and over  time. 
We then took the empirical parameter estimates back to the model, and showed that the 
observed decline  in the productivity of  research has implications for the innovation rate, the 
growth rate and the value  of new ideas that are all roughly born out. The model simulation 
also emphasizes the importance of the apparently rapid diffusion rate of  knowledge. The  fact 
that knowledge diffuses rapidly prevented what could otherwise have  been an even  greater 
productivity  slowdown  in the 1970s and early 1950s. 
- 
Stepping hack from particular parameter  estimates and the consistency of particular 
model blocks with  observed trends, we have suggested an organizing  framework for empirical 
research on the contribution of  industrial innovation to aggregate growth.  We helieve that 
this framework offers many avenues for fruitful future work.  Having demonstrated that the 
citation function works reasonably well, it would  he interesting to go back to it and focus in 
more detail  on issues of stochastic structure  and  identification. Further, to really understand 
the significance and interpretation of the observed decline in spillover potency, we need to 
look  at the variations across  sectors and geographic space in the  size of patents, and in 
the diffusion  and  obsolescence  rates.  In principle, one could categorize citing patents  by 
technological  sector, and by the national origin or U.S. state of origination. This would allow 
one to put a finer structure  on our homogenous, public good called knowledge, examining, 
for example, whether foreigners are  slower to pick up knowledge  in U.S. patents than are 
Americans. One could also, to some extent, examine whether knowledge seems to have a 
private component, by looking at whether the firm cites its own patents  more often or more 
rapidly than it does patents  owned by other firms.7' 
Consideration of cross-country citation patterns  suggests that more thought  needs  to 
be given to how to think about the rate of invention, the rate of consumption growth and 
71There is  evideace,  for example that such 'sslf-citatioas" are  more  prevaleat  for  private  firms thsa for 
universities,  and that they come aooaer io time than aon-self-citationa.  See Trajtcnhcrg, Hcodcrsoo  aad Jaffs 
(1992). 
52 the stock of public knowledge  in an open economy.  We have modelled U.S.  consumption 
growth as depending on U.S. invention, U.S. invention as depending on U.S. research, hut the 
"public" stock of knowledge available  to U.S. researchers  as being the worldwide stock. With 
respect to each of these, our assumption seems superior to the alternative polar extreme, 
but reality is probably somewhere  between the extremes. 
An interpretation of the decline  in 8, is that research is steadily becoming "narrower" and 
hence generates fewer spillovers  because each new idea is relevant to a smaller and smaller 
set of technological concerns. Empirical testing of this notion would necessitate incorporat- 
ing multiple dimensions of product  quality into the model, so that there would be a notion 
of "technological distance" between different  inventions.72  This could perhaps he imple- 
mented empirically using the patent  classification  information,73  although the classification 
information is not available in computerized form for patents  before the late 1960s. 
Finally, it would be  interesting to look at the connections among the private  valoe  of 
particular inventions, the creative destruction they produce, and the knowledge  spillovers 
they generate. To some extent, one would  expect that important patents would he high on 
each of these scales,  but ideas also probably vary in the magnitude of hoth the negative and 
positive externalities they generate. 
72Ariel Pskes eniphssizes  this point in his Discussion of this psper. 
73A version  of this is presented in Trsjtenberg, Henderson and Jaffe (1992). 
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57 TABLE  3.1:  PATENT  STATISTICS  BY  CITING COHORT 
number  average  modal 
of  total  citations  average  median  lag  average  median 
citing  sample  sample  made per  lag in  lag in  in  lag in  lag in 
year  patents  citations  patent  years  years  years  patents  patents 
1975  694  3493  5.03  15.30  9  2  838,442  631,512 
1976  689  3352  4.87  14.67  8  2  820,938  569,471 
1977  650  3322  5.11  15.21  8  2  857,036  580,613 
1978  651  3385  5.20  14.93  8  3  846,948  578,342 
1979  443  2391  5.40  15.65  9  3  891,220  644,482  1980  648  3690  5.69  15.67  9  4  883,639  624,897 
1981  650  4044  6.22  16.12  9  3  908.679  611,175 
1982  571  3716  6.51  16.22  10  4  927,214  677,083 
1983  550  3520  6.40  15.99  10  5  914,550  658,850 
1984  662  4058  6.13  15.39  10  3  887.513  641,609 
1985  706  4733  6.70  16.10  10  3  924,547  632,644 
1986  700  4801  6.86  16.31  11  2  952,094  704,355 
1987  821  5665  6.90  16.39  11  2  970,055  703,255 
1988  766  5487  7.16  15.77  10  3  958,933  650,782 
1989  932  7130  7.65  16.43  11  2  1,003,940  728,840 
1990  928  7458  8.04  15.35  10  3  986,169  713,108 
1991  935  7017  7.50  16.39  10  3  1,056,534  737,182 
1992  596  4515  7.58  16.46  10  3  1,082,150  761,274 
All yrs.  12592  81777 TABLE 3.2:  CITATION  FUNCTION REGRESSION  RESULTS 
Parameter  1  2  3  4 





















MSE  0.184  0.130  0.124  0.122 
2 (LLK-LLKpc)  —  537.6  70.6  15.0 
Notes: 
Dependent variable:  Sample  citations from year t to year s/((Sample patents)(  total patents)). 
Sample: t from 1975-1992; s from 1900 to 
* See Figure 3.2. 
Estimates of j976  —  are omitted to conserve space. 
(LLK-LLKpc): log-likelihood  minus the log-likelihood  of the previous column. TABLE  3.3:  INNOvATIoN FUNcTIoN  RESULTS 
I  &  S-E/Pop.  R&D  R&PI 


















































Dependent variable: t,b weighted aggregate US priority patents by year of applica- 
tion. 
Sample: 1958-1989. TABLE 3.4:  GROWTH EQUATION  REGRESSION  RESULTS 



























—  -  -  - 
LLK  5.752  7.237  4.697  6.315 
N: Dependent variable: smoothed growth rate of US consumption expenditure 
Sample:  1958-1989 TABLE 3.5:  STATISTICS FOR CREATIVE  DESTRUCTION SAMPLE FIRMS 
firm  average 
average  patents  average  average  estimated 
number  average  patents  growth  times  total  total  rate  of 
of  total  firm  per  rate of  firm/sector  sector  sector  creative 
sector  firms  observations  value  firm  value  value  value  patents  destruction 
1  30  441  542.23  72  0.04455  352.45  l4735.4fi  167.02  0.0145 
2  44  684  2351.03  67.0877  0.0743  3768.71  96900.08  2889.46  0.0318 
3  16  226  4070.11  78.0487  0.03546  4622.25  57903.42  1141.43  0.0129 
4  21  318  2652.53  45.1792  0.05299  1123.76  49921.29  907.29  0.2511  5  16  239  706.93  16.841  0.05748  337.34  9956.7  25.5.97  0.0304  6  20  303  8224.99  79.8119  0.05127  5477.57  146432.80  l544.fi5  0.0018  7  24  341  208.75  5.0469  0.07579  143.5  4158.79  112.46  0.0411 
8  21  326  4530.83  58.7791  0.14140  3378.6  88065.11  1209.72  -0.0012 
9  33  489  1286.94  54.1984  0.09234  2063.89  38265.89  1708.56  0.1313 
10  27  418  1607.58  57.2847  0.12077  2159.74  39483.43  1508.15  0.0693 
11  27  393  1147.94  34.916  0.02499  1349.37  27557.80  877.26  0.0246 
12  34  511  1071.48  6.3053  0.03260  226.17  32952.44  205.77  0.0115 
13  31  451  502.24  14.6386  0.08774  695.64  13135.86  418.41  5.0056 
14  13  200  1726.71  15.34  0.08214  475.53  20197.74  195.03  0.0065 
15  33  493  1333.17  16.7728  0.04794  872.42  39768.57  525.17  0.0105 
16  23  342  547.36  9.462  0.07767  518.28  11241.32  207.74  0.0205 
17  49  757  2145.09  41.749  0.06716  3995.33  99554.18  2018.69  0.0205 
18  24  339  587.77  9.6962  0.04060  285.85  11881.87  208.21  0.0084 
19  29  425  751.29  12.4965  0.05136  931.02  19417.10  346.84  0.0101 
20  27  393  300.32  3.4122  0.10359  318.63  6767.87  85.57  0.0152 
21  25  368  632.95  15.9484  0.05136  653.64  13540.95  375.9  0.0297 
All 
sectors  567  8457  1658.93  31.3948  0.06210  1712.52  43774.37  940.05  0.0355 
Notes: 
Sectors:  1.  Adhesives and coatings; 2. Chemicals; 3. Electrochemistry;  4. Drugs; 5. Cleaning and 
abrading; 6. Petroleum and refining; 7. Machinery (non-dec.); 8. Computers  and data processing; 
9.  Electrical equipment;  10.  Electronic communications; II. Stone, clay and glass; 12.  Food;  13. 
Instruments;  14.  Medical; 15.  Primary  metals;  16.  Misc,  consumer goods;  17.  Automotive; 18. 
Paper and packaging; 19.  Refrid. and heat exch.; 20.  Static structures;  21.  Farm and construction 
equipment TABLE  3.6:  CREATIVE  DESTRUCTION  REGRESSION  RESULTS 
Notes:  Dependent variable: firm value growth rate minus sector value growth rate. 
Sample:  8457 observations  on 567 firms, 1966-1981. 

























R2 = .0366 
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Figure 3.5a:  Patents/Research 
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Figure  4.2:  Phase diagram 
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